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I N R E C EN T yea 'r~ S , h e gem 0 n i cst a b iii t 'y' the 0 )"-- Y ., w h i c h a )"-- g U est hat 
international economic openness and stability are dependent on the 
existence of a single dominant state capable of managing the 
international economy, has become increasingly prominent. This 
theory took off with the publication of Charles Kindleberger's The 
W 0 )"-. 1 din D e p )"-. e s s ion (1), a stu d y 0 f the e con 0 m i chi s t 0)"-- Y 0 f the 
interwar period, which concluded that the intensity and duration of 
the Great Depression was a result of a lack of international 
economic leadership. Ash e put it, II F 0 )"~ the w 0 )"-- 1 dec 0 nom y t 0 be 
s tab iIi zed, the )"-- e [ had] t 0 be a s tab iii z e )""' - 0 n est a b iii z e )""' II ( 2) a 
Unfortunately, the old stabilizer - Britain - could no longer lead 
and the Un i ted S tat e s , the 0 n 1 y co un t )""' Y t hat co u 1 d ., w 0 u 1 d not ( 3) • 
Hence the resulting international economic disorder of that period. 
This conclusion has been elaborated upon and applied to other 
periods by several political scientists and economists (4). It 15 
now something of the conventional wisdom that a single stabilizer or 
hegemon is necessary for the international economy to be stable and 
open. The theory has both explanatory and prescriptive elements. 
It claims to explain the causes of instability and based on this 
explanation it provides solutions - namely that a hegemon should 
perform certain functions for the international economy. Th e s e., 
according to Kindleberger, include: 
1. main ta ining a relatively open market for distress goods; 
2. providing counterc yclical, or at least stable long-term 
lending; 
3. policing a relatively stable system of e xchange rates; 
4. ensurIng the coordination of macroeconomic policies; 
.-. 
c.. 
5. acting as a lender of last resort. (5) 
R state which IS capable of providing these functions and has 
the will to do so IS described as a hegemon. 
This generalized hegemonic stability theory claims to be deductive, 
its propositions being derived from a study of the economic histor y 
of the past century. The period is usually divided into four 
s e g men t s ( not inc 1 u din g the two W 0 )""' 1 d W a )""' s): ( 6 ) 
1860-1913: Stable, open international economy under British 
hegemony. 
1919-1939: Unstable and closed international economy; no state 
willing to play the hegemonic role. 
1945-1971: Stable, open international economy under 
American hegemony. 
1971- Growing instability and closure of the 
international economy as the United States becomes 
less able and less willing to provide hegemonic 
I e ad e )""' s hip . 
Ther e are several ways In which one co u ld evaluate the validity of 
hegemonic stability theory. One could, fo'(' instance, adopt a 
historical approach and examine the four periods in detail to answer 
the following questions: 
1. Did Britain In fact play the hegemonic role ascribed to it 
between 1860 and 1913 and, if it did, ~'Jas it this that explains 
the stability of that period? 
2. How much did the absence of a hegemon c ontribute to the 
economIC difficulties of the interwar period? 
3. How has the changing economIC status of the United States 
affected the functioning of the international economy in the 
postwar period? 
This historical approach has the obvious advantage of being 
comprehensive and it would certainly provide a thorough assessment 
of hegemonic stability theory. However, it requires a detailed 
knowledge of a vast and complex sweep of economic history and is 
beyond the scope of a short thesis - not to mention my own 
abilities. I shall therefore adopt a different and more limited 
approach. 
One of the important claims that arIses from hegemonic stability 
theory is that the decline of a hegemon and the resulting lack of 
leadership are the principal causes of the emergence and persistence 
of international economic disorder. This is supposed to hold true 
for the 1920s and 1930s and also for the post 1971 period. If it 
turns out that international economic disorder can be better 
accounted for by factors other than the absence of a hegemon it will 
mean that the theory is either incorrect, or only partially valid, 
requiring substantial qualification and revision. 
In this thesis I shall attempt to examIne the causes of 
international economIC instability In the interwar period with a 
vIew to determining first, whether or not hegemonic solutions to the 
economic crisis were at all possible and second, whether or not 
hegemonic stability theory adequately explains the period's economIC 
instability. 
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On the question of the possibility of hegemonic solutions, my 
argument is that after the First World War, of all the Great 
only the United States had the potential to provide the 
Powers , 
international economy with hegemonic leadership. To some extent it 
did do this, mainly in the financial sphere, by providing the 
capital which helped to facilitate international trade and restore 
financial stability. 
This hegemonic leadership, however, had several limitations. The 
most significant of these was that, given of the self-contained 
nature of its economy, the United States was structurally incapable 
of providing a market for distress goods. This meant was that even 
if the United States had fully attempted to act In accordance with 
the policy prescriptions of the theory its actions could not have 
had a significant impact on the existing structure of world trade 
and the payments. A second limitation was that after 1933 the 
United States government proved politically and economically 
incapable of sustaining even its limited hegemonic policies in the 
face of deteriorating domestic and international economic conditions 
and strong domestic demands for nationalistic policies. Thus, the 
only possible hegemon of the interwar period was itself incapable of 
fully providing the international economy with hegemonic leadership 
and consequently fully fledged hegemonic solutions to the crisis 
were not possible. 
The question of whether or not hegemony or the lack of it explains 
economic conditions of the interwar period 1S more complex. The 
fact that the international economy collapsed despite the exercise 
of limited hegemony could suggest one of two things: first, that 
hegemony might not have been as important a determinant of economic 
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conditions as hegemonic stability theory claims, or second, that 
limited hegemony gives only limited order. My argument 1S that the 
first of these suggestions IS true; the second possibly so, but only 
coincidentally: no causal connection between hegemony and disorder 
can be dr"'awn. This is borne out by my analysis of the timing of 
changes in United States economic policies and the collapse of the 
international economy which shows that the two major turning points 
in United States foreign economic policy - 1933 and 1935 - lagged 
behind changes in the international economy (7). The }""" eve r"" sal 0 f 
the limited hegemonic policies, pursued since the close of the First 
World War, occurred only as late as 1933, three years after the 
international economy had collapsed in 1930, and the gradual return 
to more liberal, hegemonic policies came only after signs of 
international economic recovery, beginning in 1935. This 
relationship between the state of the international economy and 
United States foreign economic policies can be represented as 
f 0 1 low s ~ w he}""" e the a}"""}""' 0 w s t"' e p}""' e sen t the d i }"'" e c t ion 0 f c au sal i t Y f 0 }""' 




Closed and Unstable 
Closed and Unstable 
G Or"' a d u aIR e c 0 v e }""' y 
- ) 
-) 
U. S. Economic Policies 
Limited Hegemony 
Limited Hegemony Continued 
Nationalistic reaction 
Return to Hegemonic policies 
Thus, the causality assumed by the hegemonic stability theory - that 
the ending of hegemony precedes economic disorder - does not hold 
for the period; in fact, the direction of causali ty 1S quite the 
opposite. The theory's independent variable turns out the be the 
dependent one, thus calling into question its explanato ry logic. 
R second set of reasons for assumIng that hegemony may not have been 
the key variable in explaining the state of the international 
economy IS discussed In the third chapter of this thesis. In it, I 
provide a synthetic examination of some alternate factors that 
explain the economic crISIS. Its significance for theory is that it 
shows that the roots of economic instability lay In factors hegemony 
could have done little to overcome. These factors included: the 
disruption to the international economy caused by the First World 
war; long-term structural imbalances in the international economy; 
domestic structural problems in several leading economies (including 
the United States), which made domestic, let alone international 
stabilization difficult; international political tensions; and, 
ironically, the counter-productive effects of the pursuit of 
hegemonic policies in a context that may not have required them. 
The conclusions that follow from this analysis are: 
a) There IS no necessary causal relationship between the absence 
of a hegemon and international economic instability_ 
b) There are factors other than hegemony that determine the 
openness and stability of the international economy. 
It IS worth noting, however, that this IS only a limited critique of 
hegemonic stability theory, SInce it does not address the question 
of the role of a hegemon In creating an open and stable 
international economic regIme. That IS, it does not addres s the 
theory's historical validity for the 1860-1913 or the 1945-1g71 
periods. What this thesis does question is the theory's explanation 
of the breakdown of stable and open economic systems. And this is 
significant for two reasons: first , it establishes historical truths 
about why the international economy was unstable in the interwar 
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period, and second, by doing 50 it shows up the historical 
inaccuracies of some hegemonic stability theorists' explanations of 
the economic disorder that has emerged Slnce the early 1970s (8). 
These explanations have ~~elied heavily on an analogy with the 
situation of the interwar period. America's present decline 15 
supposed to m1rror Britain's earlier decline, and there 1S a fear 
that just as in the 1930s, when the United States refused to perform 
the required hegemonic functions, so too today no country seems 
willing or able to fill the hegemonic gap. This thesis shows that 
the analogy is misplaced, since the interwar period's econom1C 
problems were not caused by a lack of hegemony but by a complex set 
of factors, several of which were unique to that period, and it 
implies that explaining current economic problems will require a 
~ 
examination of this period on its own terms paying attention to its 
own unique circumstances. Reasoning by analogy with the interwar 
period will not suffice. 
C H R PTE R TWO 
WRS HEGEMONY POSSIBLE? 
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TO E RLUATE the adequacy of hegemonic stability theory' 5 explanation 
o f e con 0 m 1 c ins tab iIi t yin the i n t e 'r"' w a .,.-. p e .,.-. i 0 d , t h t-' e eke y que s t i on 5 
need to be addressed . First, could any of the econom1es provide 
hegemonic leadership similar to that of Britain during the later 
half of the 19th century? Second, even if there was a potential 
hegemon, were the economic and political constraints such that even 
a s t t-. 0 n g h e gem 0 nco u 1 d not h a v est a b i liz edt h e i n t e 'r-' nat ion a 1 
economy? Third , wa s there in fact any significant correlation 
between the economic difficulties of the period and the presence or 
absence of an active h e gemon? 
The an s w e .,.-. toe a c h 0 f the seq IJ est ion s w ill b y and 1 a t-. g e d e t e.,.-' min e 
the degree to which hegemonic stability theory provides an 
a c c e pta b 1 e e x pIa nat ion 0 f the e con 0 m i c d iff i cuI tie s 0 f the p e .,.-. i 0 d • 
Wit h t-. ega 'r-' d tot h e f i t-. s t two que s t ion s , I ~, '(' g u e t hat the his tot" Y 0 f 
period shows that while the United States was In some ways a 
pot e n t i a 1 h e gem 0 n , i t 1 a c ked c e t'"' t a ins t 'r-' U c t u.,.-. a 1 f eat IJ t' e san d the 
political will to be fully effective in t 1S ro e. 
e gem 0 n flo w e t-. e dIn the 1 g 20 s but s u f f e t-. e d ~, d 'r-' a mat i c .,.-. eve r sal 1 n 
t e g30s. The i n 2 , b i I i t Y 0 f the e a t-. 1 y I I P t'"' 0 t 0 - h e gem 0 n y II e x e 'r cis e d b Y 
t e nited States to maintain a stable and open internationa 
e coo m y tog e the t-. wit h the .,.-. e ,~ son 5 h Y i t d t-. 0 p p e d its h e ge m 0 n i c 
po 1C1es 1n favour of more at i 0 a - i 5 tic 0 n e 5 aft e t-. 1 g 2 g 5 U 9 g e st 
a "wo-fo_d conclusion: a ) hegemony ~"-Ias not a s u fficient co n d1 t io n to 
a v 0 i d the e con 0 1 C C t-. I SIS 0 f the 1 g 3 _ 5 , 2 . d b ) P ',."" _. an h ege mo ni c 
DO IC1es e x p a1n_ 9 t e co d ' tio of the 1 t e'"' atio n a eco n o my , 
as t e co dition of the I ternatio a eco 0 y .l.. ' 2.... t o a 2 'r-'g e 
d e 9 t-. e e e x pIa ~ e d R e -. 1 C a h e ge l IC pol ' c ' es. o J e ~ i r d 
q u es.!.. ' a -'g u e t ' 2 , ,, .I Eoe an y wos re at i v el y a 'r -' gi l ~, : tot e 
Q 
J 
economlc difficulties of the period; they were rooted ln domestic 
policies of varlOUS countries and ln structural imbalances of the 
international economy. These conclusions will by justified ln what 
follows. 
POTENTIAL HEGEMONS AFTER WORLD WAR I 
BRITAIN 
At the end of the war it was widely held that after a short period 
of adjustment the international economy would return to normality, 
that 1S, to the patterns of trade and exchange that existed before 
the war. This V1ew was perhaps nowhere more strongly held than ln 
Britain. Britain had been the archetypal hegemon before the war, 
though its centrality in the international economy had probably 
peaked in the 1870s. Nevertheless, it was assumed that it could 
continue to manage the international economy after the war much as 
it had done previously (1). 
Britain was, however, no longer really able to play the role of 
hegemon due to major economic changes caused by the war. The war 
had been expensive for Britain. It was financed through the 
liquidation of its American assets and by borrowing heavily from the 
United States and the Dominions (2). In addition, the government 
incurred a large domestic debt: only about 20~ of Britain's war 
expenditure came from revenue sources; the rest was borrowed (3) . 
Financing of war expenditure from domestic borrowing need not In 
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itself have been inflationary, had it come from genUIne saVIngs. 
Howe V e)" .... , m 0 s t cam e f r .... 0 m the c)" .... eat ion 0 f new m 0 n e y , wit h the 
consequence that the price level at the end of the war was three 
times what it had been at the beginning (4). Under the rules of the 
gold standard Britain would have been obliged to deflate its economy 
in order to maintain prewar parity. But it was politically 
impossible to start the peace with a depression, so rather than 
deflate, the pound was allowed to float and convertibility was 
suspended. It lost value rapidly gOlng from $4.76 down to $3.40 
(5) • The fall in the value of the pound and the suspensIon of 
convertibility reduced confidence In the pound thereby limiting its 
international role. The United States was the only country that 
r .... e rna i ned 0 nth ego 1 d s tan dar .... d , con seq IJ e n t 1 y , the po un d beg ant 0 be 
supplanted by the dollar as the world's main reserve currency. 
indicated that the centre of economic power and stability had 
shifted across the Atlantic during the course of the war. 
In Britain, the years till 1925 were dedicated to restoring the 
This 
pound to its prewar parity of $4.76. T his pol icy, s IJ P P 0 r .... ted b y the 
II una n i mit y 0 fin for .... m e d bus i n e s s , fin an cia I .a n d pol i tic a lop i n ion II , 
(6) was designed essentially to restore the City to its prewar role 
as the centre of international finance. 
This restoration required far more than just the return to parity. 
The fact was that the prewar position of Britain In the 
international economy rested on conditions which no longer existed. 
Before the war Britain was a major exporter of textiles, ships, 
engineering goods and coal. I n t u 'r .... n , i tim p 0 'r .... ted )" .... a w mat e)" .... i a 1 s . It 
was also the major supplier of capital in the international economy. 
After the war Britain's ability to export capital was reduced due to 
1 1 
a more precarIous balance of payments position caused by a decline 
in its traditional exports and an Increase In its imports. By 1~2~ 
British exports fell by 1~~ on their prewar volume, even though 
world trade had grown by 27~, and Britain's share of world exports 
declined from 13.9~ in 1913 to 10.8~ in 1~2~ (7). 
One consequence of this was that new overseas capital Issues 
averaged only £115 million between 1920 and 1929 compared with £200 
million in the decade before the war (8). The real value of these 
capital exports had declined even more. The capital that Britain 
did export did not come from a current account surplus but 
increasingly from short term loans drawn from other financial 
centres. Britain borrowed short and lent long. This was an 
acceptable practice -indeed it is normal banking practice - so long 
as there was sufficient confidence in the pound. In turn this 
depended on the sufficiency of gold reserves held by the Bank of 
England. 
Before the war British gold reserves were by no means sufficient to 
cover all its debts. However, this did not affect confidence in the 
pound since the British economy was seen to be sound and, more 
importantly, there was no other rival international currenc y . This 
had changed after the war: the British economy was no longer sound, 
its overseas debts were larger, and the pound was now rivalled by 
the dollar. Consequently, Britain found it increasingly difficult 
to retain previously invested funds or to attract further investment 
from foreigners. Much of the world's supply of capital now came 
from the United States and France (9). Thus, a major aspect of a 
hegemonic role - the supply of international capital - proved to be 
somewhat beyond Britain's capacity in the interwa r period. 
1 ·-, Co 
Another feature of a hegemon 1S that its economy should be a able 
absorb the exports of other countries and so help sustain the flow 
of international trade and payments. This had been the case with 
Britain at least Slnce the repeal of the Corn Laws in the 1840s. 
The interwar period, however, saw a significant reversal of 
Britain's traditional policy of free trade. Britain lost many of 
her traditional export markets after the war, either because of the 
g l""' 0 w tho fin d u s t )""' Y wit h i nth e m a)""' k e t s , ( f 0 l""' e x amp 1 e , i n I n d i a wit h 
the growth of the textile industry), or because third countries 
(mainly Japan and the United States) had supplanted it (10). 
The full extent of the set-back to British exports was temporarily 
obscured by the removal of the German challenge to British 
commercial interests immediately after the war (11). But as the 
German economy revived following the stabilization of the mark in 
1924 it resumed its natural dominance in eastern Europe and began 
making inroads into the Latin American market. Faced with this 
competition, British thinking began to change. Free trade no longer 
see m e d a v i a b 1 e pol icy and, inc l""' e a sin g 1 Y , a n I I imp e l""' i ali s t II S c h 0 0 I 
emerged, which stressed the economic importance of the Empire. t..J i th 
exports languishing it became increasingly clear that Britain cou ld 
no longer cope in a free market environment. Britain therefore 
withdrew its commitment to a liberal non-discriminatory 
international order retreating into a protected system of Imperial 
Preferences. This involved raising tariffs around the Empire to 
maximize its exports to India and the Dominions (12). 
The formation of this Empire trade block was Britain's response to 
its decline from a hegemon to a middle ranking economic power. In 
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e f f e c t , B)"' ita ina c k now led g edt hat, des pit e its he)"' 0 i cat t e m p t s t 0 
restore London to its former role as the centre of internationa l 
trade and payments, it could no longer manage the international 
economy single-handedly. Indeed, far from being able to ensure the 
continued existence of a liberal international economy, Britain 
found it difficult to keep even its own economy open and stable. In 
the future liberal minded statesmen saw that the only way to return 
to an open international economic order was under American 
1 e ad e )"' s hip (1 3) • 
FRANCE 
The possibility that France might playa hegemonic role was always 
very slight because of the structure of its economy, ; t ,-- :;) economlc 
ideology, the instability of its governments (24 changes between 
1930 and 1940), and the fact that it was probably the country which 
suffered the most physical damage as a result of the war (14). 
French economic policy was very closely tied to its security policy_ 
It was assumed that German reparation payments would provide not 
only for the repair of the damage caused by the war, but also help 
sort out the financial chaos caused by the enormous expenditures 
incurred during the war. It was also hoped that reparations would 
help ease France's security concerns by stifling German recovery and 
g )"' 0 w t h (1 5) • 
F r' a n c e , eve n m 0 )"' e t hat B r' ita in, r' eli e don d e f i cit fin an c i n 9 top a y 
for its war effort. As a consequence that there was a five-fold 
increase in price levels from 1913 to 1919. L ike B r' ita in, F r' an c e 
14 
did not return to the gold standard; it preferred to allow the franc 
to depreciate rather than experience domestic deflation. This 
depreciation and accompanying inflation did not have an altogether 
negative impact. Inflation actually helped reconstruction and 
facilitated growth, due to easily available credit, and depreciation 
helped boost exports (16). 
Nevertheless, the franc had to be stabilized, mainly because lack of 
confidence in it had caused a massive flight of capital, soarIng 
inflation, rapidly depreciating currency and large budget deficits. 
While this capital flight helped lubricate the international 
payments system, it could hardly be regarded as responsible 
provision of international liquidity as would be expected of a 
hegemon and once the franc was stabilized under Poincare, French 
capital began to return, causing major difficulties for Britain, 
though it helped the franc return to convertibility in 1926 (17). 
Even after the stabilization of the franc in 1926, French monetary 
policy did not conform to what would be expected of a hegemon. The 
French had never been happy with the gold exchange standard set up 
at the Genoa Conference of 1922. They saw it as an attempt by 
Britain and the United States to retain the advantages they enjoyed 
by having the pound and the dollar as international currencies. 
Soon after returning to the gold standard France began to convert 
large quantities of its London sterling reserves into gold. It also 
sterilized the inflow of gold (18) and so made it difficult for 
deficit countries to export to France. These policies undermined 
British efforts to continue international lending, and reduced 
confidence in the pound. Thus, in terms of facilitating 
international exchange the French seemed to be spoilers of the 
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system (1<3). 
T his neg at i v e ass e ssm en t 0 f F)""' e n c h pol icy was, howe v e "1'"', 0 n 1 y how the 
British viewed it - which is essentially the perspective adopted by 
hegemonic stability theorists. From the French point of view the 
policies demanded by Britain (to maintain French balances in London 
and stop sterilizing gold inflows) were merely devices designed to 
serve Britain's interests. II The B.,."' i t :i! s h we.,." e , i n e f f e c t , ask i n g the 
French to underwrite the reserve role of the pound and the 
international investment position of the City - both of which the 
F t" e n c h vie wed as dan g e .,." 0 us 1 y un sou n d II ( 20) • 
W hat eve .,." the me.,." its 0 f the F.,." e n c h a "1''' gum en t , the fact .,." e m a i ned t hat 
its policies restricted Britain's ability to play the hegemon. At 
the same time France did not assume a hegemonic role herself: the 
franc did not acquire a significant international role and because 
of the French policy of sterilizing gold inflows international trade 
and liquidity did not expand. 
The s t "1''' U c t U"l''' e 0 f the F.,.'" e n c h e can 0 m y ~"" as 1 nan yea sen 0 tid e all y 
suited to absorb large quanatities of imports. F.,. ... ance had n e v e"l'''' 
been as deeply involved ln the international economy as Britain, and 
it was far more self-sufficient ln raw materials and agricultural 
p"l''''od uee. As imp 0 )" ... tan t , F"I'''' a nee was not as i n d us t )" ... i ali zed as B"I'''' ita i n 
and therefore needed less imports to fuel its industry. 
Not having the same degree of dependence o n the international 
e can 0 my, F "1'''' a nee, un 1 ike B t" ita i n i nit she gem 0 n ice"l'''' a , f 0 un d t hat 
policies designed to stabilize the international economy were not 
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necessarily compatible with its domestic economlC interests. Its 
politicians made it clear that French interests overrode 
i n t e t"' nat ion a Ion e san din sis ted t hat, II the F t"' e n c h e con 0 m y and 
currency must first be restored before France would take an active 
i n t e t"' est i nth e t"' e h a b iIi tat ion 0 f 0 the t"' nat ion s. II ( 2 1 ) 
Thus, France was not, could not have been, and did not want to 
be a hegemon. 
GERMANY 
.. 
In some ways Germany was the most likely of the European powers to 
assume the role of a hegemon. Its relative share of world 
manufacturing output was by 1913 higher than either Britain or 
F t"' a n c e , and its tot ali n d u s t t"' i alp 0 ten t i a 1 ( est i mat e d f)'"' 0 m a 
combination of iron/steel production and energy consumption) was 
eve n h i 9 h e t"' , a s the tab 1 e 5 below i n d i cat e: ( 22 ) 
Table 1 
ReI at i v e S II a)'"' e s 0 f W 0 t"' 1 d jT1 a n IJ fa. c t u t"' i n g 0 u t P lJ t ( ~<. ) 
1913 1928 1938 
Bt"' ita i n 13.6 9.9 10.7 
Ft"'ance 6. 1 6.0 4.4 
Ge)'"'man y 14.8 11. 6 12. ..... { 
United States 32.0 . . ~9 --....; • ....J 31.4 
Table 2 
Relative Industrial Potential of the Powers 
(U.K. ln 1900 = 100) 
1913 1928 1938 
Bt"' ita i n 127 l--C::-~....J 181 
Ft"'ance 57 82 74 
Get"'man y 138 157 214 
United States 298 533 528 
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The problem for Germany was that its potential was never ful ly 
)""' e ali zed. The conflict between Germany's potential and its actual 
sit u a t ion i n p a )""' t e x p 1 a ins the II G e )""' man P)""' 0 b 1 emil • At the h e a)""' t 0 f 
the issue was the German perception that the old European balance of 
power was made obsolete with the emergence of a small number of 
W 0 )""' I d Pow e )""' s - the Un i ted S tat e s , R u s s i a, and the B)""' i tis hEm p ire. 
Germany saw no reason whv it should be restricted within its 
• I 
European boundaries, and it therefore sought to expand into eastern 
Europe and build an extra European commercial and political Empire. 
This naturally brought it into conflict with Britain and France 
(23) . 
The maIn point from our perspective IS that being a late comer to 
the game of Empire building and industrialization, Germany never had 
a strong commitment to the ideals of liberal economics which were an 
essential part of Britain's period of hegemony. This was partly due 
to the fact that German industry and its exports often came into 
conflict with British interests which were protected by the power of 
the British state - usually in the form of closed colonial markets -
or by the fact that British industry was initially stronger and more 
competitive than German industry_ Consequently, Germany had 
traditionally adopted protectionist rather than free trade policies 
and had a relatively high degree of state involvement in its 
economy, neither of which were conducive to the development of a 
lib e r"' a I h e gem 0 n i c )""' ole ( 24) . 
These features may have been modified had Ger"'many been gIven the 
opportunity to integrate itself into the international economy on an 
equal basis with Britain and France. Howe v e r"' , t his sma 0 t h 
integration did not occur, with the consequence that Germany waged 
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two war"' s t 0 a chi eve its a 1 m s ( 25) . 
The result of the First World War for the German economy was 
dis a s t r .... 0 us. It lost 13~ of its prewar territory, 10~ of its 
population, 15~ of arable land, 75~ of lron " are deposits, 44~ of plg 
lron, 38~ of steel, and 26~ of coal production. On top of all this 
i twa sma d e top a y r"' epa r"' a t ion s , i nit i all y set at $ 33 b ill ion ( 26 ) . 
Faced with these difficulties, the relatively weak Weimar Republic 
resorted to deficit financing with severe inflationary consequences. 
It was not until 1924 that the mark was stabilized and only in 1925, 
with the Locarno Treaty and the Dawes Plan in place did the German 
economy begin to stabilize. Thus, in the fi"('st Ilalf of the 1920s 
Germany was in no position to really manage its own economy 
successfully, let alone provide a managerial function for the 
international economy. 
The second half of the 1920s saw considerable improvement In the 
G e "r"' man e con 0 my. I twa s , h 0 ~.o.,J eve r"' , ext r .... e mel y d e pen den ton the i n flo w 
of American capital. Germany incurred long term debts of some $7.5 
b illion during the 1920s, with capital imports for 1927 alone 
exceeding $1.03 billion. This capital was necessary to cover 
reparation payments and also to provide hard currency to pay for 
i m por"'t s. However, capital inflows declined sharply after 1928, 
falling from nearly $1 billion that year to $482 million in 1929 and 
-$540 million in 1931 (26). T his cap ita Ish 0 }" .... t fa lIe x e }""' ted a 
powerful deflationary impact on the German economy. 
Increased exports may have provided a solution to Germany's payments 
difficulties. Germany had the potential to e xport far more than it 
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did, but few countries were willing to accept imports on the scale 
necessary to finance Germany's reparation payments, and ln any 
event, international demand was extremly weak from 1930 onward. 
With hard currency ln short supply Germany was forced to turn to 
barter trade, especially with eastern Europe, so beginning the 
formation of a relatively closed trading bloc (28). 
Without the ability to export capital, and being unable to pay for 
imports except on a barter basis, German foreign economic policy was 
ln many ways the opposite of what would be required of a hegemon. 
And the shift emphasis from civilian to military goods after 1933 
only made these restrictive policies more necessary. This was 
beFause resources from traditional export industries were diverted 
to unproductive armament industries causing a further reduction in 
hard currency earnings. By 1938 Germany had only 1~ of the world's 
gold and financial reserves and a strict regime of currency 
controls, barter arrangements, and special deals become necessary 
(29). 
Thus, Germany ln the interwar period was a thwarted world power. It 
had failed to become fully integrated into the international economy 
and was forced increasingly into the formation of an exclusive 
economic sphere of influence. Needless to say, this was not liberal 
hegemonic policy, nor did it assist the efforts of other powers to 
preserve the open international economic order. 
THE UNITED STATES 
The United States was one of the few countries that benefited 
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economically from the First World War. During the course of the war 
it changed from being a debtor to a creditor nation. New York 
overtook London to become the centre of world finance, and the 
dol 1 at"' , b a c ked b y 481- 0 f the w 0 t"' 1 d' s g 0 1 d t"' e set"' v e s , beg ant 0 t a k e 
over the pound's role as Key Currency (30). The United States 
economy was already the largest in the world before the war (see 
tables 1 and 2 above) but the war accelerated its relative growth. 
During the 1920s the United States experienced an unprecedented 
expansion which saw the development of large scale industry based on 
the most modern technology. The manufacturing boom drew in large 
q una n tit i e s 0 f t"' a w mat e t"' i a 1 s - t'" u b bet"' , tin, pet t'" 0 leu m , etc., and the 
competitiveness of American industry saw a vast expansion of 
~ 
exports, especially cars, agricultural machinery, and office 
equipment. This trading network was aided by the growth of American 
capital exports and investments. America overtook Britain as the 
w 0 t"' 1 d' sma 1 n sou t"' ceo f cap ita 1 , i n dee d , i t n eat"' 1 y d 0 ubI e d B t"' i tis h 
capital exports during the 1920s as the table below indicates: (31) 
Table :3 
u. s. and B t"' i tis h F 0 )"" e i q n Len din g , 1 9 2 il- - 2 9 ($ mil 1 ion 5 ) 
u. S. Bt"' ita i n 
1924 96'3 59121 
1925 11Z176 419 
1926 1125 536 
1927 1337 639 
1928 1251 b 7 III 
1929 671 447 
Total 6429 ............ 7\1 ~ . .:J'L 
The extent of American economIC dominance IS difficult to overstate; 
21 
as Kennedy puts it: 
It still remains staggering to note that the Unites States 
in those years was producing a larger output than that of 
the other six Great Powers taken together and that her 
overwhelming productive strength was further underlined by 
the fact that the gross value of manufacturers produced per 
head of population in the United States was nearly twice as 
high as in Great Britain or Germany... (32). 
Thus, the United States seemed to be the most likely hegemon after 
the wa}" .... It was the largest, most productive and technically 
advanced economy in the world. It was the foremost supplier of 
capital to the international economy and, as we shall see in the 
f 0 I low i n g sec t ion, i twa s , con t }""' a r"' y t 0 con v e n t ion a I bel i e f s , qui t e 
deeply involved in managing the international economy and finding 
solutions to international political conflicts for the most part of 
the interwar period. 
AMERICAN INTFRNATIONAL POLICY AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
American foreign policy ln the 1920s was characterized by two 
dominant alms. The first was a desire to create and sustain a 
stable and open world economy one that would enable the rapid 
expanslon of American trade and investments. The sec 0 n d ~~J a s a 
desire to minimize the domestic costs that may have resulted from 
pursulng the first alma There was no doubt In the minds of policy 
makers that In the event of a conflict between domestic and foreign 
aim sit was the i}""" d u t Y toll p)""" 0 S per"" A mer"" i c a f i }""" s t II - asP r"" e sid e n t 
Warren Harding put in his inaugural speech in 1921 (33 ) . 
The e xis ten ceo f the set ~AJ 0 a 1 m san d the ~"" e 1 at i v e p}""" i o}""" i t Y the y ~~ e r"" e 
gIven have important implications for evaluating the adequacy of 
hegemonic stability theory. First, to the extent that hegemonic 
policies were pursued but still failed to avoid economIC instability 
it suggests that the explanation of instability must lie elsewhere. 
Sec 0 n d , sin c e Un i ted S tat e s ' h e gem 0 n i cpo 1 i c i e s we r"' e p u)""' sue don 1 y 
insofar as they did not conflict with its domestic political 
priorities, it meant that the only potential hegemon in the interwar 
period was itself not fully capable of providing the international 
economy with the necessary hegemonic management. (It was also 
limited in its pursuit of hegemony by the structure of its economy, 
as we shall see in a separate section). Ins h 0 r"' t, h e gem 0 n y was 0 n 1 y 
marginally related to the coming economic crisis and because the 
pursuit of hegemonic policies were only possible in a limited way, 
the policy prescriptions of hegemonic stability theory amounted to 
wishful thinking. And to the extent that impossible hegemonic 
solutions were attempted at the expense of alternative, non-
hegemonic ones, they would have been counter productive. 
---- * ----
It has often been taken for granted that the interwar period was for 
the United States one of political and economic isolation, 
symbolized by its refusal to join the League of Nations, and by t h e 
infamous Fordney-McCumber and Smoot-Hawley tariffs. This pet'iod of 
isolation is supposed to contrast markedly with American policy of 
deliberate involvement in European and world affairs after the 
Second World War. Evidence of this involvement is found In the 
Mar"' s h a I I PIa n , the U 1\1 , the set tin 9 u p 0 f the I MFa n d the W 0 r"' I d B ~o n k , 
and later, the creation of NATO. This contrast in American policy 
i s the e sse n ceo f w hat Gad dis has calle d the II G Or"' eat C y c 1 e II the 0 r"' Y 0 f 
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history, and it IS central to the historiography on which hegemonic 
s tab i lit Y the 0 )""' y 1 S b u i 1 t ( 34) . 
As a rough generalization this juxtaposition of the two post-war 
eras is not completely wrong. The )""' e ali t y is, howe v e )""' , m 0 .,."' e 
complex. In some respects the main difference between the two post-
war eras relates not so much to the fact of American involvement but 
the form that involvement took and the degree of commitment behind 
it. The II G)""' eat C y c 1 e II the o}"'" y a 1 sot end s t 0 i g n 0 '1"'" e imp 0 '1""' tan t 
differences between the 1920s and the 1930s. The first post-war 
decade saw a good deal of American involvement In European affairs, 
though this was reversed in the early 1930s only to be resumed In 
the latter part of that decade. 
American involvement In the interwar period saw an emphasis on 
private sector involvement, encouraged by the government and often 
coordinated by the New York Federal Reserve Bank. This form of 
involvement reflected the prevailing opinion as to the proper 
balance between government and business, and also gave the executive 
branch of government · a means of being involved without being seen to 
be involved. This was important since large segments of public 
opInIon, and the majority of Congres s, opposed American involvement 
in European affairs (35). 
By the end 0 f the Sec 0 n d W 0 '1""' 1 d Wa'l"" , howe v e r"' , the e x p e Or"' 1 en ceo f the 
Great Depression, the emergence of the Soviet Union as a major 
power, and new perceptions regarding the importance of Europe to 
America's economic and security interests, changed public and 
Congressional opinion on the need for unreserved involvement In 
European affairs. Conseq uently , the second post-war era saw a far 
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greater role for government and a firmer commitment by the United 
States to continue its involvement, even if it meant short term 
domestic costs (36). 
In the years after the First World War the United States pursued a 
policy of attempting to balance its desire to fulfil its 
international obligations with the need to protect domestic 
interests and take heed of the majority public oplnlon which was not 
in favour of involvement in European affairs. Because there was no 
strategic threat to the United States, economic concerns dominated 
its foreign policy. The major theme of American policy was the 
II 0 pen Do 0 'r"' II, wh i c h was a pol icy aim e d at C'r"' eat i n g a II s tab lea n d 
peaceful international order conducive to the expansion of American 
e x pO or"' t s , the p'r"' 0 t e c t ion 0 f A m e 'r"' i can 0 v e r"' sea sin v est IT! e n t s , the 
control of foreign supplies of raw materials, and the dissem ination 
o f Am e 'r"' i can ide a 1 san d val u e s. II ( 37) . 
Europe was central to the achievement of these aims since many 
business, financial and agricultural leaders recognized that without 
European recovery the international economy and consequently 
American exports could not expand. Prior to the war Europe took 60~ 
of American exports, 83~ of her crude material exports and 71~ of 
all foodstuff exports. These sectors were the ones hardest hit by 
the slump of 1920-22, so it was natural that their plight focused 
policy makers' attentions on the restoration of European prosperity. 
In addition, the restoration of European purchasing power was seen 
as essential for the economic development of Latin America and other 
tropical regions~ as Europe was their main export market. These 




This orientation towards the reconstruction of the European and 
international economies was a reflection of the changed status of 
the United States caused by the war. It had changed from a net 
debtor to the largest creditor nation, being owed over $10 billion, 
mostly as a result of allied war debt obligations. Its e x po)""' t S 
which stood at $2.5 billion at the beginning of the war rose to $8 
billion by 1920, and imports increased from $1.75 billion to $5 
billion over the same period. The proportion of world trade gOlng 
to the United States grew from 8.3~ to 12.g~ from 1913 to 1922, and 
there was a five fold lncrease in its manufactured exports between 
These changes did not go unnoticed by business and government 
lead e)""' s. Their perception of the growing interdependence of the 
world economy and of the interrelationship between export expansIon 
and the health of the domestic economy was sharpened by the 
experIence of the short but intense post war slump of 1920-21, 
(caused by the exhaustion of pent up postwar demand and tight 
monetary and fiscal policies designed to control rapidly rising 
inflation) . American concern for the health of the international 
e con 0 my, )""' 0 0 ted ins elf - i n t e)""' est , w 0 . s c ham p ion e d b 'y' tho s e sec to)""' S 
w h i c h we)""' e m 0 s tin vol v e din i t - cot ton, cop pel""' , ).", 1 C e ~ r"' y e , t 0 b a c co, 
wile at, Z 1 n c , tin and, inc 1'"' e a sin g 1 y , aut 0 mob i I e san d mac h i n e )""' y 
man u fa c t l-1"r"' e 'r"' S • The government was also interested since, among 
other things, the still electorally significant agricultural sector 
was doing relatively poorly. The prosperity of American 
a g 1'"' i c lJ I t u)""' e , mOl""' e sot han E u t"' 0 P e' 5, was d e pen den ton e x p 0 'r"' t m a (' k e t s . 
Another factor which pushed the United States towards an 
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internationalist role was a perception of its own growIng dependence 
on foreign raw materials. The Commerce Department was of the 
opinion that Ilforeign trade is of greater importance to our 
manufacturing industry in furnishing its raw materials than In 
providing markets for finished productsll (40). The growIng awareness 
of the dependence of American industry on imported raw materials led 
the Hoover administration to take steps to combat the efforts of 
foreign government sponsored cartels which controlled the marketing 
of products like rubber. 
Oil was the commodity that caused the greatest concern and the 
American government fought for and encouraged oil companies to 
secure foreign oil supplies on an equal basis with their European 
( m a i n 1 y B)""' i tis h ) )""' i val s . Other commodities which were seen as 
imp 0 )""' tan t wet"' e t"' U b bet"' , woo d p u 1 P ~ tin, nit )""' ate san d n i c k e 1 • 
The Navy was a major contributor to the sort of thinking that 
s t )""' e sse d the imp 0 )""' tan ceo f sec u }'"' i n g a c c e sst 0 Or"' a w mat e 'r"' i a 1 s • It 15 
an indication of the seriousness with which policy makers took the 
policy of the Open Door that throughout the 1920s Japan and Britain 
were seen as prospective enemies, not because they threatened vital 
security interests but because they were a threat to the commercial 
ambitions of the United States. Navy's War Plans Division even 
recommended plans for a possible war with Britain. Its d i )""' e c tot"' 
w)""' 0 t e i n 1 9 27 : II His t 0 'r"' Y [i n d i cat e s ] t hat the w 0 )""' 1 d' s two 9 j""' eat est 
nations eventually fight to decide superiority and relieve t r ade 
competition. II (41). 
The realization that domestic and international prosperity were 
linked led the United States to take steps to maintain and e x pand 
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American exports by encouragIng foreign demand. This was done 
through several measures. The War Finance Corporation was 
reactivated in 1921, but when it proved unable to cope with the 
agricultural slump the Treasut'y and the New York Federal Reserve 
Bank attempted to become more deeply involved In Europe's financial 
stabilization. This called for a substantial Increase In the 
outflow of American capital. The Edge Act, which permitted a wider 
range of institutions to engage in foreign lending, was an important 
aspect of this. 
American officials were aware that potential payment problems were 
expected to emerge as a consequence of the economy's persistent 
balance of payments surplus. Private foreign lending was therefore 
encouraged to provide America's trading partners with funds to pay 
for American goods. This was, however, seen as a temporary 
solution. 
economy. 
What was really required was the revival of the European 
This required, among other things, the financial and 
economic rehabilitation of Germany. To this end America provided 
capital to stabilize the mark after the hyperinflation of 1923, and 
influenced the Europeans to accept the Dawes Plan, which was a 
proposal made by a committee chaired by American banker, Charles 
Dawes, which established a new schedule of annual reparation 
payments, to be monitored by a newly established Reparations Agency. 
Recognizing Germany's weak payments position, the Plan also made 
provision for a loan of 800 million gold mar ks . By allowing Germany 
to fulfil its Treaty obligations and raising confidence In the 
German economy the Plan encouraged the inflow of large amounts of 
capital which in turn enabled reparation paymen ts to run smoothly 
(42). The United States also put pressure on France and Germany to 
accept the Locarno Treaty, which provided a settlement to security 
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questions relating to Germany's western border (43). 
There are significant similarities In American policies towards 
European economIc reconstruction and Germany's place in the European 
order In each of the two post war eras. In their analyses of the 
causes of the two World Wars, American policy makers have stressed 
the importance of economic autarky in discouraging growth and 
setting the stage for German hegemony on the continent. The 
solution according to them was for Germany to be reintegrated into 
an open and revitalized European economy one that was itself a 
part of a global liberal economy - large enough to contain Germany's 
power and ambition (44). The efforts of the United States to revive 
the European economy and encourage European integration after the 
Second World War are well known. Similar policies were pursued 
after the First World War. Charles Maier describes them in a 
comparison of the two periods: 
... Some of the same dilemmas and solutions marked both 
recoveries. By the mid-1920s Americans were finally helping 
ease Europe's postwar balance-of-payments difficulties by the 
enthusiastic purchase of European bonds. At the same time 
leading bankers on both sides of the Atlantic pressed for 
currency stabilization and mcinetary convertibility on the basis 
of the gold standard: the Reichsmark was anchored in late 1924, 
sterling in April 1925, the lira in 1927, and the French franc 
(legally re-established exclusively on a gold base) in 1928. 
The laboriously negotiated tariff compromises and trade 
treaties of the latter 1920s along with such inter industry 
agreements as the Entente International de l'Acier advanced the 
integration of the major Continental steel and chemical 
producers. Agreements between industries across frontiers 
encouraged mergers and concentration within the component 
national economies. In a similar sequence after World War II, 
the European Recovery Program of 1948-51 and subsequent Mutual 
Security assistance provided American credits to compensate for 
Europe's massive dollar deficit. The European Payments Union, 
the product of negotiations extending from 1948 to 1951, 
worked toward renewed currency convertibility. The Coal-Steel 
Community of the early 1950s reinforced the capitalist revival 
of the second postwar period (45). 
Even though economic considerations were important, American foreign 
policy In the 1920s was not driven simply by the desire for economic 
gal n. There was a belief that the pursuit of a liberal open 
economIC order was compatible with and indeed reinforced, peace and 
equity. II Wet"' e i t not f 0 t"' com met"' c e , the t"' e w 0 u 1 d ben 0 c i viI i z at ion II , 
said President Harding (46). 
A corollary of this VIew was that expenditures on armaments were a 
m a.) 0 t"' C au s e 0 f II fin an cia 1 c h a as, flu c t u a tin 9 e xc han get"' ate s , 
com met"' cia 1 s tag nat ion, and e con 0 m i c dis 1 0 cat ion. II ( 4 7) • Peace and 
political stability were seen as prerequisites for growth and 
economic stability. 
These beliefs led the United States to become deeply involved 
in promoting arms control agreements. The major achievement 
was the Washington Naval Agreement which saw Britain, Japan and the 
United States agree on limiting their fleets, and provided for 
consultation among them on matters related to the Pacific. The 
other major treaty sponsored by the United States was the Kellogg-
Briand Pact of 1928, outlawing the use of force as a means of 
settling national disputes. 
These efforts indicate that the failure of the United States to join 
the League did not mean it was no longer involved In political and 
security concerns of the rest of the world. The t"' e a son s wh'.j the 
I 
United States did not join the League are complex. A c co t"'d i n 9 t 0 
Leffler it was because Wilson did not have sufficient awareness of 
prevailing trends in internationalist thought in the United States. 
By creating a political rather than an essentially legal institution 
he went against long established dis trust of the use of political 
machinery by statesmen schooled in the old diplomacy. Most 
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internationally oriented business and peace organizations thought 
t hat t"' at he ·,.... t han a pol i tic a lOr"' g ani z at ion., a n II i n t e t"' r"' e 1 ate d set 0 f 
sound judicial institutions, wise economic policies, and enlightened 
m u 1 tin at ion a 1 coo per"' a t ion 1 nth e p r"' i vat e sec tOr"' II was nee d e d ( 48) • 
S i mil a r"' 1 y , W ill i a m A • W ill i am s has s how nth at the d iff e t"' e n c e s 
between proponents and opponents of the League do not correspond to 
a simple internationalist - isolationist dichotomy since the actions 
of most of those who fought participation in the League belies this 
simple classification. "The so-called isolationists of the twenties 
. . . ~~ e t"' e i n fa c t bus i 1 yen gag e din ext end i n gAm e t"' i can power" "., w h i 1 e 
II the 1 ate 1""' pol i c i e s 0 f man y who f a v 0 u r"' e dad h e t" e n c e tot h e Lea g u e 
cast serIOUS doubts upon the assumption that they were willing to 
negotiate or arbitrate questions that they defined as involving the 
nat ion ali n t e r"' est II ( 49 ) • What was at issue according to Williams, 
was not the League itself, but the appropriate national response to 
what appeared to be a crisis of capitalism - the changing 
international and domestic division of labour, dissatisfied farmers, 
the growth of organized labour, and the weakening of colonial 
e ITI p i 1""' e 5 • 
The implication of all this 15, to quote Williams agaIn, that 
"The widely accepted a.ssl.lmption that the United States was 
isolationist from 1920 through 1932 IS no more than a legend •.. Far 
from isolation, the foreign relations of the United States from 1920 
to 1932 were marked by express and extended involvement with - and 
i n t e r"' v e n t ion i nth e a f f a i 'r"' S 0 f - 0 the r"' nat ion s. II ( 50) • 
----- * -----
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The argument and narrative presented above, shows that there 1S goo d 
reason to dismiss the isolationist interpretation of American 
history for the 1920s. Enough has been said to indicate that the 
United States did have significant elements of a hegemonic policy In 
place. However, two important aspects of American policy detract 
from this picture of purposeful hegemony. The first was that 1n 
terms of tariff policy, the United States was fairly restrictive 
not what would be expected of an ideal hegemon. The second was that 
the internationalist orientation of the United States did not 
survive the coming of the Great Depression, again indicating that as 
a hegemon the United States did not act in a counter-cyclical manner 
to stabilize the international economy. 
Both these aspects have important implications for the argument I am 
advancing. First, as indicated at the beginning of this section, 
the fact that America did not, and indeed could not, have acted as a 
fully functioning hegemon means that the policy prescriptions of 
hegemonic stability theory were not possible. Evidence of this l S 
presented in the following section which shows that the payment 
imbalances of the interwar period were only marginally related to 
American foreign economlC policy: even if the United States did 
follow the trade policy prescriptions suggested by hegemonic 
stability theory it would not have significantly affected balance of 
payments outcomes. Th · • 1 S, of co Ur"'S e, means that the imbalan ces had 
s t ructural rather than policy related causes. Second, with rega r d 
to the abandonment of the limited hegemonic policies pursued by 
United States until the depression, I shall show that the c h ange I n 
policy was not the causal antecedent of the depression but rather 
vlce versa: it was the depression that caused changes in American 
hegemonic policies. 
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UNITED STRTES TARIFFS RND PAYMENT IMBALANCES OF THE 1920s 
One of the principal problems of the interwar international economy 
was that of persistent balance of payments imbalances. The 
United States was the main surplus nation. Current account deficits 
incurred by other countries in their trade with the United States 
were financed by capital exports from the United States and to a 
lesser extent Britain and France. These capital exports for the 
most part did not contribute to the development of export industries 
in deficit countries which might have corrected the payment 
imbalances, therefore some sort of adjustment was required SInce the 
outflow of funds from the United States could not go on 
indefinitely. 
The solution suggested by hegemonic stability theory and several 
economic historians was for the United States to have adopted 
different economic policies - lower tariffs and closer adherence to 
the rules of the gold standard (51). Trade restrictions, it IS 
argued, were a major cause of payments imbalances. Had the United 
States followed hegemonic policies similar to Britain's before the 
war, the result would have been a stable and international ooen 
I 
economy. 
This line of reasoning IS flawed SInce it does not take into 
account the very different economic environment of the 19205 
compared to the prewar period, and it ignores the fact that the 
United States had a very different domestic economic structure 
compared to Britain. 
To test whether changes In tariff policies would have had a 
significant impact on international payments it IS necessary 
to estimate the prIce elasticity of United States import demand and 
the potential market for the main categories of imports. I='r"' i ce 
elasticities are important because the tariffs affect demand through 
price variation. If it turns out that demand was price inelastic 
then tariff changes would have little effect on import levels. The 
potential market IS important since if items produced in the United 
States were significantly more competitive than those produced 
elsewhere then small changes in price cause by tariff policies would 
not lead to a substitution of domestically produced goods by 
imp 0 r"' t s ( 52) • 
In an important analysis of the cause of the United States trade 
surplus in the 1920s, Falkus has argued that only a major change In 
the structure of the United States economy could have produce a 
reversal of its trade surplus. America's economic structure had 
evolved over several decades and therefore the trade surplus was not 
s imp 1 y the p r"' 0 d u c t 0 f P 0 s t - w a 1'"' e con 0 m i cpo 1 i c i e s ( 53) . 
The most significant feature of the United States economy In this 
context was that it was virtually self sufficient in both industrial 
goods and prImary products. This made it difficult for other 
countries to find large markets that were not already supplied by 
domestic producers. As a consequence the United States had a very 
low ratio of imports to GNP, which was evident well before the 
1<320s, as the table below indicates: (54) 
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Table 4 
Imports as a ~ of GNP 
U. S U. K. 
1889-93 6.0 26.0 
1892-6 5.7 '-It::'" ,. c....J.b 
1897-1901 4.3 .-,1::" 6 C...J. 
1902-6 I 4 ·-'7 I::" -'to c • ...J 
1907-11 4.4 28. 1 
1909-13 4.2 28.6 
19 ·-'1 .-,r=-C -C...J 4. 1 .-,r=- 7 c...J. 
1926-29 4.3 .-,( .-, c ( • C 
What IS more, the United States also had an extremely low marginal 
P t"' 0 pen sit Y t 0 imp 0 )""' t , t hat 1 S, 0 u t 0 fag 1 V e n inc t"' e men tIn nat ion a I 
Income only a small proportion would be spent on imports. The 
marginal propensity to import of the United States from 1924-38 IS 
estimated at 0.07 compared with and average of 0.3 for most European 
i n d u s t t"' i a liz e d c 0 un t t"' i e s ( 55) . 
Two categories of country had deficits with the United States; 
fit"' S t , the p t"' i mat"' y p t"' 0 d u c i n g nat ion s , and sec 0 n d , the i n d u s t r"' i a 1 
nations of Europe. With the first group, United States demand was 
limited to a few commodities that could not be grown in the United 
States or which were not found there in large quantities. The 
principal agricultural imports were therefore tropical products 
coffee and bananas being the main ones. Petroleum and copper were 
the main industrial raw materials that were imported. Agricultural 
producers from temperate regions - eastern Europe and Australasia 
(which suffered the worst payments imbalances) - could not export to 
the United States SInce they competed directly with products where 
the United States was competitive (wheat, beef, etc.) (56). 
35 
Most imported prImary products that had a market In the United 
S tat e s did not fa c eta )""' iff s . The s e inc Iud e d )""' a w s ilk, )""' u b b e 'r"' , 
cop p e 'r"' , pap e 'r"' , pet 'r"' ole urn, and c 0 f fee. The primary products of 
temperate regions did face tariffs, but they were in any case not 
compet it ive. The only prImary product to be significantly affected 
by tariffs was sugar. The tariff was designed to protect the 
domestic sugar beet industry_ Howe v e 'r"' , S U g a'r"' p'r"' 0 d u c e din the 
Philippines was imported duty free (57). 
The situation with regard to industrial products from Europe was not 
v e 'r"' y d iff e 'r"' e n t • Long term developments were making European exports 
less competitive compared to domestically produced goods. As Falkus 
explains: 
Well before the First World War the major trends in United 
States foreign trade were moving against industrial 
c 0 un t 'r"' i e sin g e n e r"' a I , and a g a ins t E U'r"' 0 pea nco un t 'r"' i e sin 
particular. The United States was increasingly a net 
exporter of manufactured products; the surplus, already 
substantial before the First World War, was considerably 
enhanced as a consequence of the war and the proportion of 
manufactures in the United States exports rose rapidly. 
There was a relative decline in Europe's share of United 
States imports of manufactured products, and European 
exports to the United States were more and more 
concentrated on specialized, high-quality goods which were 
largely supplementary to rather than competitive with the 
output of the United Sta-i:;es. (emph asis added ) . (58) 
This long term trend was gIven impetus by the war. o v e r"' its c 0 u r"' s e 
the United States developed industries which previously were 
stifled by overseas competition (industrial chemicals being the 
most significant of these); it increased the scale and efficiency of 
its manufacturing; and it developed several new industries, notably 
automobiles and business machines that would form the basis of its 
industrial supremacy for decades to come. 
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These developments meant that the United States came to have an 
absolute advantage 1n the production of most industrial commodities. 
The average productivity of American workers was considerably higher 
than their European counterparts. It has been estimated as being 
twice as high on average, and three to four times as high in motor-
cars, radios, iron and steel products, and machinery (59). This sort 
of productivity advantage, combined with more advanced technology 
resulted in the United States market being virtually monopolized by 
d 0 m est i c p}"'" 0 d u c e 1'''' s , 1'"' ega 1'''' dIe s s 0 f t a}""' iff s • Sewing machines are a 
good example. In 1914 The United States exported $11.49 million but 
imported only $0.59 million. The corresponding figures for 1921 
were $7.31 million for exports and only $0.40 million for imports. 
In both 1914 and 1921 there were no tariffs on sewing machines, 
indicating the irrelevance of tariffs to the United States trade 
balance in machinery~ A t a}"'" iff 0 f 1 5 - 30'1- was imp 0 sed i n 1 9 22 , but 
it was obviously unnecessary (50). This is not an isolated example. 
Similar findings were reported by the official Temporary National 
Economic Committee in a study of 1,807 products in 1937. Tar'iffs 
were found to affect only a small number of commodities - just 14~ 
of the total sample (51). 
This finding 1S strengthened by studies of the effect of e xchange 
rate variations on United States imports. Exchange rate variations 
have a similar price effect as do tariffs, therefore demand 
variations resulting from exchange rate changes can be used to 
estimate the likely affect of tariffs. The evidence is that 
exchange rate variations did not affect levels of exports to the 
United States: Be 1 g i urn a.nd F)""'ance bot h ha.d rna.) a}""' de p)""'ec i at ion s 
against the dollar yet this did not 1mprove their export 
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performance, while Italy and Switzerland which did not depreciate 
had s i mil a't"' e x po 1:."' t P e 't"' f 0 't"' man c esc 0 m p a 't"' edt 0 t h e co 1.\ n t 'r~ i est hat did, 
indicating that price levels of imports were poorly correlated to 
imp 0 't~ t d e man d ( 6 2) . 
The single most important factor that determined the level of 
exports the United States was the level of its national income. The 
correlation between the two was estimated to be 0.92 (63). Thus the 
only way the rest of the world could have significantly increased 
its exports to the United States would have been by having the 
United States grow even faster. This was unlikely, especially In 
the years till 1929, as the United States was already experiencing 
an unprecedented boom. 
Even if the United States could have grown faster, the question 
remaIns whether the rest of the world could have increased its 
output sufficiently to take advantage of this faster growth. Fall-<us 
suggests that the supply elasticities for most manufactured and 
agricultural goods would not have allowed for greatly increased 
exports; consequently, it would seem that payment imbalances could 
not 't"' e a I 1 y h a v e bee n a v aid e d ( 6 4) • T h us, the pol icy p't"' esc 't"' i p t ion 0 f 
hegemonic stability theory or rather the blame it apportions to 
American trade policy - 1S somewhat misplaced S1nce it was the 
structure of the United States economy rather than policy which 
e x plains the patterns of trade between the United States and the 
rest of the world. 
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THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES 
American economIC policies during the 1920s and 1930s showed far 
greater variability than they did after the Second World War. As we 
have seen, for most of the 1920s under Republican administrations, 
the United States tried to balance international and domestic aims. 
The result was that its foreign economic policy had elements of 
liberal internationalism while at the same time retaining more 
nationalistic elements such as tariffs which, though formally 
restrictive, had little real impact on economic outcomes. 
Even though it was recognized that the United States stood to gaIn a 
great deal from the continued e xist ence of the liberal international 
economic order, the importance of the international economy to the 
United States was not overwhelming. The United States, as we have 
seen, remained remarkable self sufficient, and for all the absolute 
Increase in its international economic involvement, its foreign 
economIC interests did not become proportionately more important. 
For example, manufactured exports as a proportion of total 
production actually decreased from 10~ in 1914 to in 1929 (65). 
In addition, the United States faced no strategic threat and 
consequently it was rational for it to see its international role a s 
definitely subservient to domestic interests. 
This, In part, explains the lack of consistency In American 
internationalism in the 1920s and also the shift in emphasis towards 
greater protection with the introduction of the Smoot-Hawley tariff 
at the onset of the Depression In 1930. 
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As the Depression took hold the Hoover Administration began to shift 
its emphasis from stressing international business opportunities to 
a more autarkic stance. The Adm i n i s t )""' a t ion ~~ as, howe v e )""' , fa i )""' I Y 
un w i I lin g t 0 imp 1 e men t )""' est )""' i c t i v e pol i c i e s sin c e the sew e n tag a ins t 
its prevlous assumptions. Even as the crisis worsened after 1930, 
the Adminsitration continued to reaffirm the viability of its open-
door economic orientation; it also kept the dollar on the gold 
standard even after Britain went off it in 1931; and it implemented 
a one year moratorium on debt payments in 1930 to help ease the 
financial crisis in Europe. However, more determined policies could 
have been formulated to try to halt the drift towards a closed and 
unstable international economy, but throughout 1931-2 Hoover and 
S tim son II )""' e f use d t 0 can eel w a )""' deb t s , sea 1 e dow n t a)""' iff s , ext end 
government loans to financially depressed nations, [and] assume 
s t )'"' ate g icc 0 m mit men t sin E u )""' 0 p e. II ( e mph a sis add e d ). ( G 6 ) 
The reasons for this somewhat weak defence of internationalism lay 
partially in the belief that government should as far as possible 
leave private enterprise to solve international economic problems, 
but more importantly, because the administration's internationalist 
policies were fast loosing support amongst business. Business, 
seeing that international opportunities were diminishing as the 
Depression intensified, began to place primary emphasis on 
stabilizing the domestic market, and linking domestic demand to 
p t"' 0 due t ion ( 6 7) . 
The Hoover administration, however, continued to lag behind business 
opinion, and to the end Hoover himself felt that the depression was 
attributable to international factors and could only be cured by 
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i n t e t"' nat ion aIm e a s u t"' e s ( 68) . By contt"'ast, Roosevelt and his 
administration argued that the Depression was essentially domestic 
in origin and required domestic remedies (Sg). Con seq IJ e n t 1 Y , un d e t"' 
the new Roosevelt administration the remaining elements of the 
internationalism of the 1920s were removed. One of Roosevelt's 
first actions was to take the United States off the gold standard, 
and in 1933 he in effect repudiated the World Economic Conference 
that was held in London to try and find an international solution to 
the d e p r"' e s s ion. "Autat"'ky became the watchwor"'d. II (7121). 
By 1 9 35, howe vet"' , Roo s eve 1 t t u 'r"' ned a way f 1'"' 0 m e con 0 m 1 c nat ion ali sm. 
He entered into agreements with Britain and France to stabilize the 
value of their currencies relative to each other and began to 
implement legislation that saw the negotiation of a serles of 
treaties on mutual reduction of tariff rates (71). 
This picture of alternating internationalism and nationalism ln 
foreign economic policy requires an explanation, for it lies at the 
heart of the issues raised by hegemonic stability theory. As 
indicated earlier, my argument is that it was the state of the 
international economy and the changing structure of the domestic 
economy that explained the changes in policy. These two factors 
were the determinants on the formation of political coalitions, 
which in turn determined policy outcomes. 
The most common explanations of changes ln American economlC polic y , 
both domestic and international, have tended to focus on the 
decisive influence of Franklin Roosevelt in shaping the New Deal. 
The see x pIa nat ion h a v e , a son e aut hot"' put it, ten d edt 0 : 
Honour his statecraft in leading the United States away from 
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isolationism toward Atlantic alliance. And they celebrate the 
charisma he displayed in recruiting millions of previously 
mar'" gin a I w 0 r'" k e 'r'" s , b lac k s , and i n tel I e c t u a lsi n t 0 his g r"' eat 
crusade to limit permanently the power of business in American 
I if e (72). 
Neo-Marxist theorists and historians argue that rather than 
attacking capitalism, the New Deal was a package of policies far 
sighted enough to save capitalism from itself. Its e r'" v edt h e 
interests of business as a whole rather than small segments of it 
(73) • 
Interpretations from a Weberian perspective explain the New Deal 
policies as growing out of the consolidation and expansion of 
bureaucratic institutions - especially those of the Federal 
Government and the expanded role of professionally certified 
e x per"' t sin m a kin gpo I icy ( 74) . 
While each of these approaches contain much that IS useful and valid 
they are not fully satisfactory, especially when it comes to 
explaining .change in policy (75). The lea d e r'" s hip a p p r'" 0 a c h , fOr"' 
instance, cannot explain why Roosevelt initially raised tariffs, 
abandoned the gold standard and, rather than reduce the role of 
business, gave them greater power by allowing the formation of 
cartels to limit price competition, only to reverse these policies 
within three years. 
Similarly, Neo-Marxist and Weberian analyses fail to explain major 
changes In policy. For example, why did an initial emphasis on 
corporatist forms of business self-regulation give way to the 
rIgorous application of anti-trust legislation in the later 1930s? 
And why did policies that initially favoured industries that were 
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vulnerable to international competition change to allow greater 
international exposure as time went by? 
An approach that avoids some of these difficulties has been 
developed by Peter Gourevitch and Thomas Ferguson (76). The i}""' 
method of analysis focuses upon different sectors and industries and 
on the factors which affected the formation of political coalitions 
which in turn influenced policy outcomes. 
The starting point of the analysis is the well known fact that 
electoral behaviour IS closely correlated with socio-economic 
status (77). This means that it IS usual for the primary political 
cleavage In a polity to be closely related to class. This class 
cleavage influences the form of party competition that develops. 
Where the working class is strong it may form its own party and 
cause business to unite around another exclusively business party. 
The party structure in Britain is a good example of this pattern. 
Where the working class IS weak, it may be unable to have its own 
exclusive party and will therefore seek to form part of a coalition, 
acting very much like a normal interest group. In this situation it 
is possible that some elements of business may be willing to form 
alliances with labour in order to galn power - provided that the 
prlce to be paid for labour's support is acceptable. 
Different sectors of business will have differential abilities to 
pay the II P)""' ice II f 0 )"... the sup po)""' t 0 f lab 0 U )""' • The factor which will 
most determine the ability to pay will be the relative share of 
wages in the businesses' value added. Where labour costs are small 
relative to value added, the sector will be able to afford higher 
... 
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wag e s , imp t"' 0 V e d soc i a 1 sec u t"' it,>, , etc; howe vet"' , w h e t"' e wag e sa)""" e a 
major cost the sector or business will be unable or extremely 
reluctant to make significant concessions to labour. Sin c e t"' e 1 at i v e 
labour costs are largely determined by the capital intensivity of a 
industry, it follows that capital intensive industries will be the 
ones that will most likely form alliances with labour. 
Different attitudes to labour thus form a major division among 
different sectors of business. A second source of division relates 
to differential international competitiveness. F i )""' m s 0 '1""' sec t 0 '1""' S 
that are internationally competitive will have a stake in 
encouraging the development of an open international economy; those 
that are not competitive will have prefer protectionist or 
nationalist policies (78). 
During the interwar period ln the United States, firms or sectors 
that were relatively capital intensive also tended to be 
internationally competitive, and those that were labour intensive 
were less internationally competitive. There were some exceptions, 
the most important being the chemical industry which was unable to 
compete with large German firms like I.G. Farben. 
speaking the relationship held (79). 
But 9 e n e r"' all y 
What this meant was that business tended to coalesce around two 
poles: one which advocated conciliatory policies towards labour and 
a liberal open international economy, and a second group which 
preferred restrictive labour polices and a regulated international 
economy. The f 0 t"' m e Y' 9 t"' 0 up, va)"" i 0 U sly cal led the II New D e a 1 
S Y nth e sis II 0 t"' the II M u 1 tin at ion alB 1 0 C II 9 t"' a d u all y cam e t 0 d 0 min ate 
policy over the 1920s. Wit h the 0 n set 0 f the D e p t"' e s s ion, howe v e Or"' , 
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it suffered a reversal, only to regroup and rally around the 
Democratic Party in the Second New Deal after 1935. This coalition, 
and the Democratic Party, have dominated American politics till the 
end of the Carter Presidency (80). 
Firms and sectors which were relatively labour intensive and unable 
to compete internationally had historically clustered around the 
Republican Party. (This had been the case since the elections of 
1896 when the so called IISystem of '96 11 was fo)""'med.) Until the 
First World War, this nationalist grouping had included virtually 
all business and made possible the long period of Republican 
ascendancy (81). 
The war, as we have seen, brought major changes to the United States 
economy. Perhaps the most significant ln this context was its new 
creditor status, which gave large east coast international banks a 
stake in the international economv. , This cause a break in what till 
then was a unified business preference for nationalist policies. 
Fur'" the r'" s t r'" a ins i nth e II S y s t e m 0 f 'g 6 II C 0 ali t ion w e r'" e i n t r'" 0 d u c e d b y 
the emergence of sectors and firms that had become internationally 
competitive and had significant export interests. The most 
s i g n i f i can t 0 f the sew e )"'" e fa)""' m mac h i n e r"' y , e 1 e c t 'r'" i cal goo d s , and aut 0 
manufacturers (82). 
With the relatively faster growth of capital intensive and 
internationally competitive firms it would have been normal to 
expect that policy would gradually be shorn of its nationalist 
e 1 e men t san d , wit h con c e s s Ion s t 0 1 abo u 'r'" b e i n gpo S 5 i b 1 e , a f 0 )""' m 0 f 
welfare state internationalism would have emerged - perhaps not all 
that different from what eventuated after the Second World War. 
Howe v e r'" , t his s 0 r"' t 0 f g 1· ... a d u a 1 s h i f t did not 0 c c u)""'; )""' at he)""' , a s ~.o,J e 
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have noted, there seemed to be a cyclical pattern of growIng 
internationalism followed by nationalism which In turn gave way to a 
more robust internationalism. 
The reversal of the trend toward an internationalist orientation In 
American policy after 1929 was not an autonomous development, nor 
was it necessarily the result of short sighted and ultimately 
disastrous nationalism as portrayed in hegemonic stability theory. 
It wa s, 'r"'athe'r"' , the result of the interaction of sectoral interests 
as they attempted to best protect their interests in the face of a 
rapidly collapsing international economy. 
The m a j 0 'r"' a f f e c t 0 f the 1 a 'r"' 9 e d )""' 0 pIn i n t e 'r"' nat ion a 1 d e man d c au sed by 
the Depression was a change In the outlook of firms that all through 
the 1920s and fought for liberal economic policies. They now began 
f a v 0 u )""' i n g 'r"' est )""' i c t i v e , nat ion ali s tic pol i c i e s , a sex p 0 'r"' t 
opportunities dried up and export drives by other countries 
threatened their domestic markets (83). 
There are several instances of just such a shift In emphasis. For 
e x amp let h e c h a i )""' man 0 f the U. s. S tee 1 co)""' P 0 'r"' a t ion was c h e e t"' e d at 
a s t 0 c k h 0 1 d e t"' s m e e tin gin 1 9 3 1 w hen h e s aid t hat , II ~"J e can s tim u 1 ate 
bus i n e s sin t his co un t 'r"' y wit h 0 u twa i tin g f 0 )""' the t"' e c 0 v e 'r"' y 0 fEu )""' 0 p e I I 
(84) • Similarly, the Chairman of Bethlehem Steel felt that if 
domestic demand took 80~ of production that was sufficient to make a 
profit and so overseas demand was not strictly necessary. The same 
stress on the domestic market was voiced by the automobile, 
pet 'r"' 0 leu man d c h e In i cal i n d u s t 'r"' i e s ( 85) • These business opinions 
eventually affected the Hoover Administration, and more so the 
Roosevelt Administration. Even Hoover reluctantly came to accept 
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t hat II w h i 1 e )"" e - est a b 1 ish men t 0 f s tab i 1 i t Y a b t"' 0 ad 1 she 1 p f u 1 t 0 us 
and to the world, we can make a very large measure of recovery 
i t"' t"' e s p e c t i v e 0 f f 0 t"' e i g n i n flu e nee. II (86) • 
As it became clear that the Depression was going to persist it 
became increasingly rational for business to call for domestic 
reflation to boost domestic demand and help speed up t"' e c 0 vet"' v . 
I 
The sed e man d s , howe vet"' , b t"' 0 ugh tin d u s t t"' Y , t"' eta i I e l'"' s , fa l'''' mel'"' san d 
ordinary people into conflict with the financial sector- especially 
the large international banks that stood to loose from inflation 
since it would reduce the value of their financial assets and by 
reducing confidence could cause the withdrawal of foreign deposits. 
I n p d d i t ion, the colla p s e 0 f t l'"' a d e and fin an cia 1 flo w s t hat w 0 u I d 
accompany nationalist solutions would mean that there would be 
increasingly less likelihood that the banks could recover their 
for'" e i g n loa n s ( 87) . 
This inevitable conflict between the financial sector and the rest 
of the economy e xpanded as t h e Depression persisted but gradually, 
th e financial sector itself split as those sections most closel y 
linked with domestic industry (th e in v estment and comme r c ial banks) 
also began to demand reflation. The only rema ining opponents of 
ref lation were the large inte r nati onal banks le d by J . P . Morgan and 
Co. Th e pow e t"' 0 f the s e I at"' g e ban k s ~"J as, howe v e j""' , g Or"' eat I y dim i n ish e d 
by Roosevelt's banking reforms. The Glass-Steagall Banking Reform 
Act, an d the Banking Act of 1935 between them restored centra 
supervision of Rm erican money and banking practices. Equally 
imp 0 r'" tan t, th e y mad e i til 1 ega I f 0 t"' a sin g 1 e ban k too p e Or'" ate bot h 
commercial an d investment arms, thus breaking the basis of the 
strength of several banks. J . P. Mo or'" g an was 0 b 1 ° g edt 0 d t ... 0 pit s 
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investment banking activities (88). 
With the split In the financial sector it was possible for a new 
coalition to form. It was an uneasy one consisting on the old core 
of the IISystem of , Q L II oJ Q , the Multinational Bloc of erstwhile 
internationalists, and the financial sector excluding the larger 
international banks. This coalition - National Recovery Coalition 
\l'J as the bas i s 0 f the F i )""' s t New De a I (1 <33.3 - 5), but was i n he)""' e n t I y 
unstable because the Multinational Bloc component of it was in 
favour of nationalist policies only as a temporary measure while the 
collapse of international trade persisted. 
H s s 0 0 n as the i n t e)""' nat ion a I e con 0 m y beg ant 0 )'"' e c 0 v e )""' aft e)""' 1 <335, 
* 
the older lines of cleavage - between nationalists and 
internationalists as existed in the 1920s - began to become apparent 
agaIn. The Multinational Bloc quickly came to dominate the 
coalition, and In effect a new coalition - the Second New Deal 
coalition - was formed. With the Supreme Court ruling that the 
Nat ion a IRe c 0 v e )""' y H d In i n i s t )""' a t ion ( N. R. Au) \l'J a s i I leg a I , Roo s e v e'l t 
too k the 0 p po)'"' tun i t Y to)'"' eve 'r"' set hell co)'"' po)""' a t i vis t II and nat ion a lis t 
elements of his first two years in government: anti-trust 
legislation was re-implemented, tariff reduction treaties were 
entered into with vigour, and the United States once more began to 
cooperate with Britain and France on the stabilization of their 
c u )'"')""' e n c i e s ( 8 9 ) • 
Other elements of the Second New Deal included a relatively liberal 
at tit u d e tow a)""' d s I abo U'r"' , ass e e n i n tile Wag n e )""' Act ( the Lab 0 )'"' 
Relations Act), and the introduction of large public works programs. 
While these actions did, to some extent, anticipate Keynesian 
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demand-management policies of the postwar period they were 
relatively limited in their scope. Even as late as 1939 the federal 
budget deficit was only $3.9 billion. Consequent 1'1, it was not 
until the rearmament program took hold in the early 1940s, (when the 
deficit rose to four times that amount) that the economy reached 
full employment (90). 
T his the n , I n b t"' i e f ,IS the e x p 1 a nat ion f 0 t"' why pol icy c han g e d s 0 
dramatically over the 1920s and 1930s. It bears out the earlier 
claim that American foreign economic policy was the consequence and 
not the cause of the Depression. Certainly there would have 
been to some degree an interactive process between policy and 
the depression, but the timing of changes in policy shows that 
policy tended to lag behind chang~s in the international econom y: 
in 1933 when full blown nationalism came into effect under 
Roosevelt~ the Depression had already been underway for three years, 
and the Second New Deal which began after 1935 came after a degree 
of recovery in the international economy. 
Given the nature of the political coalitions which formed and 
dis sol v ed, and the i t"' pol icy p t"' e f e t"' e n c e s , i tis un 1 ike 1 y t hat 
hegemonic internationalism could have been pursued in the critical 
1 929 - 3 5 pet"' i 0 d . There simply was not enough political support for 
such policies and therefore a hegemonic solution was not possible. 
Even if the political will existed, it was probably economically 
impossible for the United States to have pursued policies to 
stabilize the international economy, SInce it proved to be incapable 
of effectively stabilizing its own economy. Consequently, it was a 
destabilizing rather than a stabilizing factor in the international 
economy. But more on this in the next chapter. 
C HAP T E R T H R E E 
WAS THE LACK OF HEGEMONY RESPONSIBLE? 
IN THE last chapter we have seen that the United States was the only 
possible hegemon during the interwar period. But it was constrained 
in its pursuit of hegemonic policies because of its relative self-
sufficient. It did not depend on the international economy to the 
extent that Britain had, consequently, domestic concerns took 
priority over international ones. In addition, the structure of its 
economy was such that even if it had attempted to adopt more liberal 
trade policies their impact would have been insignificant. Finally, 
the course of domestic politics made the continuation of even the 
qualified internationalism of the 1920s impossible in the 1930s. 
In short, the policy prescriptions of hegemonic stability theory 
could not have been implemented by the United States. 
While it IS clear that hegemonic stability theory does not provide a 
viable policy prescription for the interwar period, it does not 
necessarily follow that its explanation of the causes of economic 
instability IS wrong. It is possible that even though there was 110 
suitable hegemon capable of fully implementing the requirement of 
the theory, had there been one the crisis might have been avoided. 
This implies that the lack of a hegemon was a key factor in the 
breakdown of the international economy. 
to assess the validity of this VIew. 
This chapter will attempt 
Four major factors suggest that, first, the absence of hegemony was 
not the cause of the economIC crlSIS and, second, that the attempt 
at limited hegemonic or liberal economic solutions may have been 
counter productive in the circumstance s of the 1920s and 19305. 
The four factors are: 1) the structure of the international economy; 
2) domestic policy mistakes; 3) international political conflict; 
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and 4) international monetary conflict. These factors were closel y 
intertwined and therefore difficult to keep analytically distinct, 
as the following narrative reveals. 
The economic difficulties of the interwar period owed a good deal to 
the disruptive effects of the war. The t" e was, t 0 beg i n wit h , 
physical destruction and the loss of fixed capital investment which 
had to be made good. There was also the loss of life - estimates go 
as high as 60 million in direct and indirect deaths (1). Financial 
stability was also affected. To pay for the war, Europe was forced 
to liquidate its overseas assets, borrow from the United States and 
the Dominions, and resort to financing expenditures by printing 
money -with disastrous inflationary consequences. Reparations added 
further to the financial difficulties of the time, as did the United 
States insistence that all war debts be paid In full. The 
consequence was that until reparations and debt repayments were In 
e f f e c t t" e p u d i ate d 1 nth e H 0 0 vet" 11 mot" a tOt" i u m 1 J 0 f 1 93 1 , E u )" ... 0 pea n 
payments were In constant imbalance. Germany relied on United 
States capital to pay reparations to France and other European 
co un t t" i e s , w h i chi n t u}"" nus edt h e s e fun d s t 0 'r" epa y the i t" deb t s t 0 
the United States. Thus money went In a cycle. And since the 
United States tended to sterilize gold inflows (and In had In any 
case a remarkably low marginal propensity to import), the Europeans 
could not earn gold or dollars in sufficient quantities to 
reestablish their finances on a sound basis (2). 
Traditionally, European payment deficits with the United States were 
offset by surpluses with the rest of the world. Th e wa'r" chan 9 ed 
this as several traditional markets had shrunk or disappeared 
because of industrialization elsewhere. Russia simply opted out o f 
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the international economy altogether. Britain, which had been 
Europe's largest exporter before the war, was particularly hard hit. 
Between 1912 and 1938 the amount of cotton cloth it exported fell 
from 7,000 down to 1,500 square yards and ship building, which 
amounted to almost a million tons of vessel In 1913, fell to just 
over half that amount In 1938 (3). (Britain also suffered because 
it failed to make the successful transition from its traditional 
export industries to the new science based ones - electrical 
equipment, automobiles, machinel""Y and chemicals. 
areas where trade was expanding the quickest). 
The sew e l"" e the 
European exports were also badly hit by the loss of purchasing power 
in major agricultural producing regions of the world caused by weak 
commodity prIces. Price weakness was mainly due to over-supply 
caused by long-term developments such as the openIng of new lands In 
North America and Australia, increased productivit y, and higher 
production levels induced by inflated war time demand. Immediatel y 
after the war demand was also weak because indus try required less 
and because population had decreased. The combination of over-
sup ply and w e a k d e man d )"" e suI ted ina w 0 )" .... 1 d -ItJ ide a g , .... i cuI t u)" .... a lsI u m p 
which was made worse as European agriculture recovered from the 
effects of the war. 
Economic historians have stressed the importance of this 
independent agricultural depression in e xpl aining the col lapse of 
In t h e pre-lg13 world econom y the expanSIon of 
production and incomes in the prim ary producing areas was well 
matched with the s u pply of manufactures from industrial areas, and 
this explains the volume and stabi l ity of a large segment of world 
t )" .... ad e. In the 1920s however, falling prices and incomes in primary 
c·-, 
....JC 
producing areas led to falling demand for manufactures. w. A. Lewis 
exaggerates only slightly when he claims that, 
The decline of trade ln manufactures was due nether to tariffs 
nor due to the industrialization of new countries. The trade in 
manufactures was low only because the industrial countries were 
buying too little of primary products and paying so Iowa price 
f 0 t"' W hat the y b 0 ugh t • ( 4 ) 
For a while the weakness of the prlmary sector was disguised by the 
existence of price support schemes, which operated by buying excess 
production to help keep prices high. Price support schemes existed 
for wheat, sugar, coffee, rubber, copper, and nitrates. But these 
schemes had only limited success, partly because higher prices led 
to higher production which tended to put downward pressure on 
prlces, thus straining the financial resources of the schemes. 
Indices of world agricultural prices and stocks show that prlces 
fell from a base of 100 ln 1923-25 to 70 by 1929, while stocks rose 
f t"' 0 m 1 00 t 0 1 75 0 vet"' the sam e pet"' i 0 d ( 5) • Once the finance to 
continue funding price support schemes dried up after 1929, old 
stocks could no longer be held nor new production kept off the 
ma 'r"'k et. The result was that the market was flooded with the built-
up stocks further depressing prices just at the start of the 
D e p t"' e s s ion ( 6 ) . 
Capital exports from the Unites States to a large extent made up 
for the loss of European export earnlngs and covered the payment 
deficits of the agricultural countries. This capital helped keep 
the international economy functioning. It allowed Germany to pay 
its reparations and was vital for the stabilization of several east 
and central European currenCles. In all this the United States 
performed a valuable hegemonic role. However, the export of capital 
could not go on indefinitely sInce, unlike the export of British 
capital during its period of hegemony, United States loans were not 
s elf - I i qui d at i n g , t hat 1 s , the y did not g 0 i n toe x pOt"' tin d u s t t"' i e s 
that could have earned foreign exchange with which to repay the 
debt s. 
Some of the blame for this can be attributed to imprudent lending. 
Ban k san d fin an cia 1 ins tit uti 0 n s , e age t" f 0 )""' P)"" 0 fit s , p aid s can t 
attention to how loans would be repaid, and, as Galbraith observes, 
II i fun f 0 )""' tun ate I y co)""')""' U P t ion and b)""' i be)""' y we)""' e )""' e qui )""' e d as 
com pet i t i v e ins t )""' u men t s , the y we)""' e use d. II ( 7) • This was 
particularly the case In Latin America. For instance, the son of 
the President of Peru was paid $450,000 for his serVlces In 
connection with a $50,000,000 loan and the President of Cuba was 
given a personal line of credit of $200,000 by the Chase, which did 
a large business in Cuban bonds (8). 
Though not affected by this sort of corruption, loans to Germany and 
eastern Europe were nevertheless also made withQut sufficient notice 
being taken as to how they would by repaid. For eastern Europe it 
IS estimated that only 30 to 50~ of public external loans were used 
In directly productive investments (9). Moreover some of this 
capital had a negative impact insofar as it was used to delay 
adjustment or spent on agricultural development which would merely 
have caused additional problems by further depressing commodity 
p1""l ce s. Loans were put to better use in Germany. Tho ugh eve n h e 1"" e 
some of the capital found its way into non-productive uses -
II S w i m min g -- bat h s , P 1 e a s U 'r"' ega '1""' den s , a m use men t h a lIs, hot e 1 s , 
pIa net at" i a and tile 1 ike II; (1 0 ) but m 0 S t 0 fit was use d t 0 h e 1 pIn 
the restoration of the domestic economy and payment of reparations. 
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However, little if any went into projects that would have earned 
foreign exchange. 
The American government was aware of the extent of imprudent lending 
but despite official warnings on the possibility of default, few 
American banks were willing to forego the lure of high profits (11). 
The significance of imprudent lending In creating an unstable 
financial situation should not be overstated SInce opportunities for 
prudent lending were limited. The m a I n deb t 0 l""' nat ion s , e s p e cia I I Y 
Germany and east European countries, but others as well, had few 
opportunities to earn foreign exchange to liquidate their debts: the 
United States was structurally incapable of taking a significantly 
greater level of imports; the non European agricultural economies 
were suffering from low commodity prices and a large number of them 
were locked into restrictive trading blocs centred on Britain or 
France; and other European countries were unwilling to allow an 
expansIon of imports while their own economies were depressed 
and, (with the exception of France) their own external balances were 
p'r" e c a )"" 1 0 us. Thus, there was little that could be done to Improve 
the payments imbalance of most debtor countries. In this situation, 
" tile C 'r" un c h II a sAl d C)""' 0 f t put it, II ~;"J a s b 0 un d t 0 com e i nth e end SIn c e 
creditors were hardly likely to lend indefinitely to insolvent 
b 0 )""')"" 0 we)"" sat the P)""' e v i 0 u sly II i g h )"" ate. II (1 2) . 
Could the difficulties of the debtor countries have been alleviated 
by more purposeful hegemonic policies - by, for instance, sc)""app i ng 
reparations and a more liberal commercial policy on the part of the 
United States? P)"" 0 b a b 1 Y not (1 3) . The reparations issue was 
un I ike 1 y t 0 h a v e bee n )"" e sol v e d by the Un i ted S tat e s a Ion e - i t did 
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what it could In the Dawes and Young Plans - and more liberal 
commercial policies could not have helped sInce, as we have seen, 
the United States economy was structurally incapable of taking 
significantly higher levels of imports. 
Th e fact that the II ct"unch II cam e 1 n 1929 wa s pat"t i cu I at"l y un f Ot"t unat e 
SInce it was a time when several economies were weakening, demand 
was faltering, and new investment opportunities were less obvious. 
Germany was the most vulnerable since a significant proportion of 
her on going investment was funded by foreign capital and, having 
large quantities of short term loans, she was vulnerable to rapid 
withdrawals by lenders who might want to put money on the 
temporarily more lucrative New York Stock Exchange. Th i SIS 1 n fact 
what happened. American capital exports which amounted to over a 
billion dollars in 1928 fell to about $200 million in 1929 as money 
stayed home to fuel the stock exchange boom (14). Th e bo 0 m ct"eat ed 
a major dilemma for United States monetary authorities. Allowing it 
to go unchecked ran the risk of having a precipitous crash In the 
future, but attempting to cool it by raising interest rates would 
cause capital be withdrawn from Europe, causIng an economIC 
col I a p set her" e • There was thus an incompatibility between the 
requirements of domestic and international stability. In the event 
the Fed began raising rates in 1928 to halt the financial spree. 
This pulled in capital from Europe and slowed the outflow of capital 
from the United States, but it did not restrain the speculators. 
Only the October Crash did. It was the worst possible outcome. 
This shortfall of capital was disastrous for Europe, especially 
Ger"man y. For Germany and the other debtor countries in eastern 
Europe to remaIn financially solvent they would have required 
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substantial international support to maintain the flow of capital. 
That this did not occur was certainly one of the contributing 
factors to the depth of the Depression, since it caused a credit 
s que e z e ,Ie ad i n g t 0 fin an cia 1 ban k r"' u p t c i e s , the colla p s e 0 f 
commodity prlces, and the breakdown of the system of international 
trade and payments as countries sought to conserve their limited 
currency reserves. 
Though the causal link between the drying up of United States 
capital outflows and the collapse of the international economy 1S 
clear it does not follow that United States policy was to blame. 
There are three reasons for this. Fir"' s t , b y 1 9 28 i twa scI ear"' t hat 
debtor countries had borrowed far more than they could repay 
therefore it would have been illogical for the United States to 
continue lending, especially since nearly all the lending was done 
through privately owned banks. And even if lending were continued 
for a while this would only have delayed the day when loans would 
have ceased, since there was little evidence of structural 
adjustment on a scale sufficient to allow the debtors to repay their 
debt s. 
Second, and more important, it should be remembered that after 1929 
the United States was itself in ser10US economic difficulty and 
could not really have done much to help stabilize Europe. As 
W. A. Lew i 5 put sit, II The bas i Cpr"' 0 b I e m was not t hat the Un i ted S tat e s 
did not stabilize the rest of the World, but rather that it failed 
to stabilize itself. II (15). Finally, international political 
rivalries made financial stabilization increasingly difficult as 
tensions increased during the 1930s. Even if international 
cooperation was achieved, the depth of fundamental economic problems 
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In several economIes would have meant that international solutions 
would probably have been inadequate (Ashworth, 252). 
The reasons for the instability In the United States economy 
have long been the subject of debate among economists. A synthetic 
VIew is that the domestic collapse was caused initially by real 
rather than monetary forces: the temporary exhaustion of investment 
opportunities, severe restraint on consumer expenditure and the 
collapse of business confidence after the Crash (16). As early as 
1928 housing starts had peaked as had prices; the automobile market 
was approaching saturation point at the same time; and unemployment 
grew from 1.9 per cent in 1926 to 4.4 per cent in 1928. 
Despite these indications of the boom comIng to an end, steady 
prIces combined with strong productivity growth produced high 
profits which were reflected in rising security prIces. Easy credit 
and the self-perpetuating quality of the boom in security values 
meant that there was a growing discrepancy between the world of 
financial speculation and the real economy. Monetary authorities 
began tightening credit in response raising interest rates and so 
drawing back short term capital from Europe. Tight monetary policy 
therefore had little effect on speculative activity_ But once the 
stock exchange crashed, the continuation of tight monetary policy 
made matters worse by contributing to the financial panic as credit 
became scarce and investment decisions were postponed, delaying any 
possibly recovery. 
Problems In the real economy were also exacerbated by structural 
flaws In the economy_ An important one was the bad distribution of 
income which favoured the wealthy and led to high levels of 
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expenditure on investment rather than consumption and on luxury 
items rather than staples. This meant that the economy was 
investment driven, dangerously dependent on the capital goods sector 
which in turn was particularly vulnerable to declines in consumption 
through the multiplier effect. It was also likely to collapse if 
business confidence fell (17). This is exactly what happened. With 
the collapse of business confidence following the Crash the index of 
investment which stood at 100 In 1929 fell to 9 In 1933, and even as 
late as 1939 it was only 57. (See table 5 below). 
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The economy also suffered from a weak corporate structure. As 
Galbraith explains: 
The most important corporate weakness was inherent in the vast 
new structure of holding companies and investment trusts. The 
holding companies controlled large segments of the utility, 
r"' ail r"' 0 ad, and e n t e r"' t a i n men t bus i n e s s. · Her"' e , a s v-J i t h the 
investment trusts, was the constant danger of devastation by 
reverse leverag2. In particular, dividends from the operating 
companies paid the interest on the bonds of upstream holding 
com pan i e s • The i n t e r"' r"' U p t ion 0 f the d i v ide n d s mea n t d e fa u 1 ton 
the bon d s , ban k r"' u p t c y , and the colla p s e 0 f the s t r"' u c t u r"' e . 
Under these circumstances, the temptation to curtail investment 
in operating plant in order to continue dividends was obviously 
s t r"' 0 n g • T his add edt 0 d e f 1 at ion a)""' y p r"' e s 5 u r"' e s • The 1 at t e r"' , i n 
turn, curtailed earnings and helped bring down the corporate 
pyramids. When this happened, even more retrenchment was 
inevitable. Income was earmarked for debt repayment. 
Borrowing for new investment became impossible. It would be 
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hard to imagine a corporate system better designed to con~lnue 
and accentuate a deflationa'('y spi'('al. (emphasis added) (19). 
Other problems with the economy included a weak banking structure: 
there was no lender of last resort and most banks were small single 
branch establishments. Both these factors made the banking system 
highly vulnerable to financial panic since investors had no 
guarantee that their deposits were safe. As the economy began to 
falter runs on banks became increasingly common. I nth e fit" S t SIX 
months of 1929, 346 banks failed. Monetary policy did not help. 
Remarkably, the Federal Reserve System's greatest fear was inflation 
(20) and it therefore adopted a policy of severe monetary 
contraction which further restricted credit so reducing investment 
and e can ami c act i v i t Y , lea d i* n g tom 0 t" e ban k fa i 1 u t" e s ( 2 1 ) • The 
t" e s u 1 twa s t hat b y 1 93 1 c t" e d i t fa c i lit i e s wet" e v i t" t U a 1· 1 Y non -
existent in the United States. 
Fiscal policy was also misguided. Balanced budgets were aimed for 
and this meant that there was no stimulus from this sector - not 
until the New Deal took hold, and even then the degree of expansIon 
was limited. It is worth noting that even during the New Deal 
budget deficits were never intended but occurred despite the best 
attempts of the government. Faced with rising expenditure the 
government attempted to raise taxes in order to maintain a balanced 
budget. But the tax structure which had emerged as a result of the 
Revenue Act of 1932 was regressive in its impact and consequently 
acted as a further drag on expenditurea Tax policy was the very 
opposite of the Keyensian counter-cyclical measures that were 
When the deficit seemed to be getting too large In 1936, 
the government was willing to cut expenditure. The t"' e suI twa s a 
short sharp recession in 1937 (22) . 
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Wrong domestic policies also contributed greatly to the econom1C 
depression in other countries and it 1S highly unlikely that a 
hegemon (especially one that was misguided about managing its own 
economy), could have done much about these domestic policy errors. 
Most European countries adopted orthodox economic solutions to help 
e a set h e c l""' i sis: b a I an c e d bud get s , p t"' ice s tab iIi t Y , wag e t"' est t"' a i n t . 
Keyensian economic ideas were still very much unknown. The dismal 
state of economic understanding in Britain during the 1920s and a 
good part of the 1930s was fairly typical of most other countries. 
It is well described by Hobsbawm: 
We tend to forget how small and uninfluential a minority 
[the KeynesiansJ were, until after the economic catastrophe had 
becom~ so overwhelming - in 1932-3 - as to seem to threaten the 
vel""' y e xis ten ceo f B l""' i tis h , and the w 0 l""' 1 d , cap ita lis t s Y s t em. 
The businessmen of the 19205 went into it with little more than 
the conviction that if wages and government spending could be 
cut savagely enough British industry would once again be all 
t"' i g h t , and wit h i n dis C t"' i min ate c a I I 5 f 0 l""' P l""' 0 t e c t ion f 1'"' 0 m 
the oncoming hurricane. The politicians - both Conservative 
and Labour - went into it with little more than the almost 
equally futile slogans of Richard Cobden or Joseph Chamberlain. 
The bankers and the officials who were the guardian of 
II T l""' e a s u 1'"' Y 0 t"' tho d 0 x Y II d t"' e a m e d 0 f a '(' e t u t"' n tot h eli bel""' a I w 0 t"' 1 d 
of 1913, put their confidence in balanced budgets and the Bank 
Rate and staked all on the impossible hope of maintaining the 
City of London as the world's financial centre. The 
economists, with what can only be described as a quiet heroism 
worthy of Don Quixote, nailed their flag to the mast of Say's 
Law which proved that slumps could not actually occur at all. 
Never did a ship flounder with a captain and a crew more 
ignorant of the reasons for its misfortune or more impotent to 
do anything about it (23). 
----- .* -----
Political tensions added greatly to the difficulties faced 1n 
restoring normal financial and trade relations. With the cessation 
of capital outflows from the United States, financial stability in 
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Germany and eastern Europe came to depend to a far greater degree on 
the cooperation of the central banks of Britain and France. In some 
ways France was the best placed to help, as she had the second 
largest holding of gold, after the United States. But here political 
conflicts complicated matters - and this again was beyond the 
ability of any hegemon to fully overcome. 
French policy 1n the interwar years has been the subject of 
considerable debate. It has been seen variously as intransigent and 
vindictive, especially in relation to reparations and allowing 
Germany to resume its place in the international community; or it 
has been portrayed as a realistic response to the real security 
threat it faced. The villains in this latter interpretation are 
Britain and the United States, which by refusing to supply security 
guarantees to France forced her to adopt a hawkish policy towards 
Germany. More recently, historians have begun to stress the 
structural constraints that faced each of the actors (24). These 
constraints and contradictions meant that there was no easy way out 
of political and economic conflicts and a distant hegemon like the 
United States could only have had a marginal impact. 
Jon Jacobson glves a useful list of some of these structural 
contradictions the international system faced 1n the 1920s. It 1S 
worth quoting him at length: 
First, the requirements of European stability based on the 
superior power of an alliance of Western powers over a weaker 
and restrained Germany - containment - contradicted the needs 
of a stable world order legitimized by the principle of an 
international system of self-determining democratic, and 
capitalist nation states that included Germany - reintegration. 
Second, the requisites of a European balance of power 
conflicted with those of economic recovery. Recovery required 
that Germany achieve and maintain a prosperous industrial 
economy, both to repay reparations and to stimulate European 
trade, but the balance of national capabilities demanded that 
Germany be denied the political and military hegemony inherent 
in its industrial and human resources. 
Third, there was a contradiction between the formation and 
execution of the peace settlement. The Versailles Treaty 
imposed the victor's conditions on the vanquished and took 
German hostility for granted; it therefore incorporated few 
incentives for fulfilment. Yet, the reparations and 
disarmament Clauses in particular required German cooperation, 
good will, and good faith in compliance. 
And, fourth, the requirements of internal and international 
stability were contradictory. The successive coalitions that 
governed the Weimar Republic sought the continued, incremental 
revision of the Versailles Treaty, but those governing the 
Third Republic constantly sought German adherence to its 
original provisions. Both French and German positions were 
based on the need to maintain internal political 
consensus, but the achievements in foreign policy that the two 
nations sought were mutually antagonistic (25). 
The existence of these structural constraints meant that until they 
were removed it would have been difficult if not impossible for 
simple solutions such as those suggested by hegemonic stability 
theory to have worked. The solutions suggested by the theory are 
drawn from a faulty understanding of why there was stability after 
the Second World War. This view finds support from work of Charles 
Meier on the roots of stability in the second postwar era (26) . 
Hegemonic stability theorists assume that it was policy that made 
the difference after the Second World War, but this, according to 
Meier, is too simplistic. The basis of the stability of the postwar 
era rested to a considerable degree on the political and economIC 
achievements of the interwar period: it was the product of a forty 
year struggle to achieve economic and political order. 
The major political basis of th is order was the ending of the German 
Problem, by its partition and by the tight in tegration of West 
Germany into the EC. Equally important was the domestic political 
situation that emerged in Europe after the end of the Second World 
W a)""' , w he)""' e un 1 ike the p e)""' i 0 d aft e'r"' 1 9 1 8, the )""' a d i cal Rig h twa s 
insignificant, and consequently demands for the revision of the 
outcome of the war were minimal. The Left was also in many ways 
less radical than their counterparts a generation ago. The i r"' d e man d 
was now for nationalization of certain sectors of industry and 
social security measures, rather than the earlier demands for the 
full take-over of the operation and ownership of industry the 
wOl""'k el""'s. 
The second postwar era saw the acceptance of the principle of 
management prerogative In return for a higher standard of living. 
Politics of ideology were replaced by politics of productivity. But 
the politics of productivity had to await the development of 
techniques of macroeconomic management that could deliver results. 
In the interwar period this was not achieved and so politics 
remained highly polarised. After 1945 however, economic results 
were forthcoming, due in part to the widespread application of 
Keyensian demand management principles but also to advances In 
management skills of big businesses. Keyensian principles were also 
applied at the level of the international economy, embodied in the 
new rules of the GATT and the IMF. In the analytical framework of 
Karl Polanyi, a balance between Authority and Market~ and between 
internal and external stability was found. That this balance was 
found was to a significant extent due to the Illessonsll that policy 
makers learned during the interwar period. 
Sufficient has been said to indicate that the stability of the post 
war era rested on conditions that did not exist In the interwar era, 
and that consequently, policies that worked in the former could not 
have done so in the latter. 
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----- * -----
The way In which political and structural problems of the 
international order affected attempts at economic stabilization can 
be illustrated from the experience of the international financial 
system after 1930. 
France had, throughout the 1920s and 1930s sought to use her 
financial strength to combat Germany's efforts to improve her 
commercial situation by entering into trade agreements with 
countries of Eastern Europe. These agreements threatened not only 
French commercial interests but her security ones, since they 
undermined her attempts at creating an entente to help contain 
Gel""'man y. A second French aim was to try and force Germany to give 
up its proposed customs union with Austria, which seemed to be more 
than just an economic arrangement. Finally, Fr'ance wanted to get 
Germany to reverse its armament policy and get assurances of 
adherence to the Versailles Treaty (27). 
France was only successful In its second aIm. I nth e c r'" i sis 0 f 
1931 , when Germany and Austria faced runs on their banks and the 
prospect of the collapse of their banking systems, France threatened 
to close her capital and money markets to new German and Austrian 
This was sufficient to force them to drop the plan for 
com mer'" cia 1 un Ion ( 28) . 
The aIm of reducing German e xp enditure on armaments was less 
successful. In May 1931 the Credit-Anstalt In Vienna colla psed . It 
was a major blow to international financial stability SInce it 
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controlled two thirds of Austrian industry and was easily the most 
important bank in eastern Europe. Germany, which was already In 
dee p e con 0 m I c t t"' 0 ubI e , was c aug h t up I nth epa n 1 c t hat f 0 I lowed. I n 
the space of six weeks 2 billion RM were withdrawn from German 
ban k s , m u c h 0 fit b Y 0 vet"' sea s d e po sit 0 l""' s ( 29 ) • The possibility of 
meeting reparations were consequently slim. Germany needed a large 
injection of capital to stabilize its financial sector if a total 
collapse of confidence was to be avoided. 
The United States offered a one year moratorium on all debt and 
reparation payments in an attempt to help ease the crisis. The 
French were outraged. As one French historian saw it: 
The United States, after having played a preponderant role in 
fashioning the Treaty of Versailles, did not ratify it; they 
did not join the League of Nations; they refuse to recognize 
any legal bond between their claims against their former allies 
and the claims of these allies against Germany. There they are 
now, i n t e t"' v en i n g pub 1 i c 1 y , but f 0 l""' W hat p U l""' P 0 s e ? toe x ten d a 
protective hand to their old enemy! The contradiction may seem 
strange. It is explainable in terms of the blow that a 
complete failure of Germany would inflict on her American 
len del""' 5 • H 0 0 vet"' i s the c l""' eat u t"' e 0 f the ban k s , and i n his eye s 
their interests come before any consideration of public 
mot"' ali t y ( 30) • 
With this sort of attitude common ln France it was not surprlslng 
that at the height of the crisis the President of the Reichsbank, 
Hans Luther, after having seen Montague Norman, the head of the Bank 
of England for the extension of credits, found Moret of the Bank of 
F r"' a n c e , I e sst han h e 1 p f u 1 • He was advised that the size of the 
credit requested would require German political guarantees regarding 
armaments and commitment to the treaty of Versailles. The political 
guarantees were not made and so no financial agreement was reached 
(31 ) • 
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Germany responded to the deepening crlSlS by restructuring its 
banking system and money markets with far greater state control, and 
instituted a series of exchange controls which, by ending free 
convertibility of currency, brought to an end the liberal trade and 
e xc han g e )""" e g i met hat had fun c t ion ed, a I be i t hap h a z a)""" d I y , un til the n 
(32) • 
German rearmament was the final nail In the coffin of free trade and 
exchange In eastern and central Europe, Slnce it diverted resources 
from exports to arms thus causing a further shortfall in foreign 
exchange earnlngs. N eve )""" the I e s s , German industrv's demand for raw , 
materials had grown (due In large part to the expansion of the arms 
industry), so more imports were needed despite a · lower ability to 
pay f 0 )""" the m • 
The initial response to this dilemma was for Germany to enter into a 
serles of barter deals with countries of eastern Europe, but 
eventually there was a massive temptation to resort to a war of 
plunder to feed the growing war machine that he civilian economy 
could no longer support. A s ir1 a son des C)""" i b e sit, inc)""" e a sin g 1 y , II the 
o n 1 y II sol IJ t ion II 0 pen tot his )"" e g 1 m e [ 0 u t ] 0 f the s t )""" u c t u)""" a 1 ten s ion s 
and crlses produced by dictatorship and rearmament was more 
dictatorship and rearmament ..• A war for the plunder of manpower 
and materials lay square in the dreadful logic of German economIC 
d eve lop In e n tun de)"" Nat ion a ISo cia 1 ism." ( 3 3 ) . 
The financial crISIS which began ln Austria and Germany spread to 
Britain as the same pattern of nervous withdrawals of funds was 
r'epeated. There was little confidence in the pound, especially 
after the Macmillan Report which called attention to Britain's high 
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deficit on short term account and the May Committee Report which 
noted the country's gloomy budgetary situation. The situation was 
stabilized somewhat by the injection of £50 million from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York. A further £80 million was negotiated but 
with the condition that Britain reduce its budget and cut the dole. 
But even this did not help; the run on the pound continued and 
eventually it was forced off the Gold Standard (34). 
The }""' ole 0 f II hot II 0 }""' II }""' e f u gee II m 0 n e y 1 nth e s e fin an cia 1 c}""' 1 s e s 1 s 
worth commenting on. The 1920s had seen the maSSIve growth of short 
term deposits held by foreigners which were highly mobile and to a 
large extent beyond the control of monetary authorities. This made 
financial stabilization extremely difficult even when the United 
States attempted to playa positive role. In a situation 
analogous to the later half of the 1960s onward, power seemed to 
have shifted from the state to the markets, with the consequence 
that hegemonic policies were potentially far less effective. 
With Britain off gold, the Commonwealth countries, the Scandinavian 
c 0 un t }""' i e s , J a pan, and 1 ate }""' the Un i ted S tat e s f 0 1 lowed. Without 
the gold standard international payments became far more difficult 
as only the dollar remained as an acceptable form of exchange. The 
pound and the franc tended to circulate mainly - though not 
exclusively - within their respective economic/colonial blocs. 
Barter trade became more significant, and with the loss of currency 
convertibility bilateral clearing arrangements began to displace 
multilateral trade. Thus, the central elements of the liberal 
international economic order had come to an end. 
It IS worth noting that though France was not very involved In 
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the final collapse of the pound, its policies during the later half 
of the 1920s were very much a part of the cause of the end of the 
Gold Standard. The French had never been happy with the gold 
exchange standard instituted at the conference of Genoa in 1922. 
They accepted it, reluctantly, after the stabilization of the franc 
in 1926. However, they soon began to convert their currency 
holdings into gold, in an attempt to return to a pure gold standard. 
To many Frenchmen the gold exchange standard was seen as an IIAnglo-
American plot to use money as an instrument of economic domination. II 
(35). The withdrawal of gold from London was a major factor in the 
weakness of the pound, and of the gold exchange standard. 
The case can be made, as indeed it has often been, that French 
policy was correct - it was the proper response of a state to the 
pretension of Britain and the United States to act as hegemons, when 
nether was capable of being effective or beneficial to the rest of 
the world in that role. According to this view it was the attempt 
to institute a hegemonic monetary order against the will of other 
states that lay at the root of the monetary disorder of the period. 
The gold-exchange standard that the United States and Britain had 
set up was inherently unstable since (as Jaques Reuff and Robert 
Triffin have argued), it created the temptation for the lssues of 
the international currency to fail to live within their means 
because imports could be paid for by printing money. And as this 
process continued confidence in the currencies naturally declined, 
leading holders of the currency to convert their holdings into 
gold. But since gold reserves were insufficient (at least in the 
case of Britain) convertibility had to be suspended. This was 
essentially a default on the IOUs that the currency had represented. 
Thus, it was not the lack of hegemony that accounted for the 
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monetary crISIS of the 1930s but the futile attempt at hegemony 
(36) • 
Similarly, a reasonable case can be made that the attempt at liberal 
trade relations may also have been counter productive given the 
structural constraints of the period. F a I k us, f 0 )"... ins tan c e , 
concludes that given the United States inability to import more than 
it did, the Europeans could not have avoided trade and payments 
imbalances and the consequent build up of debt so long as they 
persisted liberal trade policies. He a)"'" g u est hat, II the m 0 s t 0 b v i 0 us 
p)" ... esc t ... i p t ion f 0 t... CUt'" i n g the i mba 1 an c e sin i n t e.,. ... nat ion alp a y rri e n t s 
[would] have been for deficit nations to cut their imports, 
p t ... e f e t ... a b 1 y by dis c t'" i min at 0)"'" Y mea s u l"'" e sag a ins t the Un i ted S tat e s. II 
(37) • The pursuit of liberal policies would only have perpetuated 
the payments imbalance. And earlier action to correct trade 
imbalances by dismantling the liberal order might have avoided the 
big decline in world trade during the great depression, since it 
was to some extent the logical consequence of a situation where the 
trade imbalances could no longer be maintained (38). 
There IS evidence that In the 1930s those countries that combined 
protectionism with domestic expansionary measures did relatively 
better than those that continued with the older liberal orthodoxy. 
Closure combined with domestic expansion represented a sort of 
proto-Keynesianism, designed to work in a single econom y . 
G 0 u'r"' e v i t c h calls i t II N e 0 - 0 )" ... tho d 0 x Y II ( 39) • Its main elements were 
domestic demand expansion, sharing out of prod uction among domestic 
p)""' 0 d u c e )""' s , co)"'" po)"'" a tis t )" ... e g u 1 at ion 0 fin d u s t )" ... Y , and new t a)"'" iff and 
quotas to retain the gains from domestic reflation. 
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Britain provides a good example of Neo-orthodoxy (40). In 1931 
B}""' ita i n wen t 0 f f the g 0 Ids tan d a}""' d , ins tit ute d t a}"" iff mea s u)""' e s , and 
built a closed trading bloc in the system of Imperial Preferences. 
Industry ceased to look to exports but began to focus on the 
domestic market. Indeed it was the domestic market that sustained 
the British economy. The Midlands and the South East, which had 
most of the domestically oriented industries were relatively 
prosperous compared to the North and West which relied on 
traditional export industries. A s now, II I n d us t )""' i all y , B)""' ita i n was 
t u}""' n i n gin tot won at ion s II ( 4 1 ) • 
Neutral fiscal policy combined with easy credit and low interest 
rates resulted in a minor consumer boom led by the construction 
sect 0)"". Unemployment which stood at 221- in 1932 fell to half that 
number in 1938, and the index of industrial production rose from 100 
in 1928-29 to 129 in 1936-38, even though exports and imports 
remained virtually unchanged at 101 and 99 respectively (42). This 
suggests that British industrial growth and development could go 
ahead without the economy becoming more involved in international 
trade, indeed it might have done better by being relatively 
autarkic: industrial growth and productivity were higher in the 
interwar period than they were in the two decades till 1924 (43). 
The international manifestation of Neo-Orthodoxy was the much 
maligned bloc system. This system may not have been as harmful as 
liberal economist assume. Calleo in a review of the historiography 
oft h e i n t e)""' w a )""' m 0 net a)""' y s y s t emf eel s t hat II the b I 0 c s y s t em, 1 n 
fa c t , w 0)"" ked )"" e I at i vel y weI I , at lea s t a s a ph a s e 0 f e con 0 m 1 c 
)""' e cup e )"" a t ion and ad jus t men t II ( 44) . 
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The liberal alternative to the bloc system was the international 
Keynesianism of the post war era, or what Ruggie calls the 
II com p t"' 0 m i s e 0 fern bed d e d lib e t"' a lis m II • T his a I t e t"' nat i v e had tow a i t 
for the emergence of a quite different international economic 
structure and environment. At the very least there had to first be 
a revival of the international economy since, as we have seen in the 
case of the United States, and as Gourevitch has shown for Sweden, 
Britain and the United States, coalitions linking policies which 
promoted demand at home with internationalism could only form once 
the international economy recovered sufficiently to g1ve 
internationally oriented firms the incentive to look overseas aga1n 
(45) • 
Another condition for international econom1C openness 1S the 
existence of an expectation of economic stability. Eve n aft e t"' the 
Second World War it is worth noting that exchange controls in Europe 
did not end until the Bretton Woods system came fully into effect 1n 
1958. Domestic protectionist policies and exchange controls were 
not abandoned until there was sufficient confidence in the ability 
of government to achieve domestic and external stability. Domestic 
stability was assured by the adoption of Keyensian demand management 
policies, public control and ownership of large segments of industry 
and planning. International stability was assured by the new 
coo t"' din at i n gin s tit uti 0 n s - the I M F , the GAT T , and the W 0 t"' I d Ban k 
all backed by American economic and political weight (46). In the 
1 9 30 s , howe vet"' , t his SOt"' t 0 f con f ide n c e co u I d not bee n g end e t"' e dan d 
consequently governments were extremely reluctant to end 
protectionist measures. N e 0 - 0 t"' tho d 0 x Y 0 t"' II Key n e s ian ism i non e 
countryll combined with restrictive trading blocs were probably all 
that could be achieved. 
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It should be clear, even from this simplified narrative that the 
course of international economic developments in the 1920s and 1930s 
was far from simple. There were a multitude of factors involved, 
and outcomes were only marginally related to the exercise of 
hegemonic policies. In addition, there are good reasons to feel 
that the very attempt at hegemonic and liberal economic policies 
during the period may themselves have contributed to the economic 
crlsls. Non hegemonic and non liberal economic solutions may not be 
optimal policies In theory, but glven the circumstances of the time 
they may have been the only viable ones. 
C HAP T E R F 0 U R 
CONCLUSION 
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It should be clear from the preceeding chapters that hegemonic 
stability theory does not provide an adequate explanation of the 
economic and political crisis of the interwar period. The central 
finding of the thesis is that the pursuit liberal hegemonic policies 
in the interwar period was constrained primarilly by structural 
factors: macro or global structural factors that affected the 
international economy, and domestic structural factors that affected 
single countries. Policy was very much a dependent variable. 
The choice of policies were dependent on the interplay of group 
interests which in turn depended on economic and political 
structures. This finding confirms the value of the growing tendency 
In the discipline to base analyses of international politics less on 
a unitary actor/state centric model and more on broader 
disaggregated analyses of domestic influences on foreign policy, and 
analyses of the structural features of the international system. 
The thesis also also reinforces a recent, (or more accurately a 
revived), trend in the discipline: the stress on the importance of 
the economic dimension of international relations. 
The preceding chapters have shown that hegemonic stability theory 
does not work either as an explanation of the interwar economic 
crisis or as a policy guide. Successful hegemonic policies were not 
possible during the interwar period since the two most important 
hegemonic functions - providing counter-cyclical lending and an open 
market for distress goods - could not have been performed by the 
United States, which was the only potential hegemon at the time. 
Counter-cyclical lending could only occur if there were signs of 
improvement in the trading position of the borrowing countries. If 
there was insufficient adjustment it would have been irrational for 
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private American banks to continue lending - they would simply be 
spending good money after bad. However, in the 1920s and 1930s 
domestic and international economic constraints made it extremely 
difficult for the debtor countries to redress their payments 
imbalances. The indebted industrial countries in Europe were 
confronted with shrinking markets in the agricultural regions due to 
import-replacing industrialization, and inadequate purchasing power 
caused by an independent agricultural depression. The United States 
market was difficult to enter because of the strength of domestic 
competition in almost every branch of industry. S i mil a r" 1 y , the 
agricultural debtor countries found that they could not liquidate 
their debts because the industrial countries demanded too little of 
their exports and paid too Iowa price for them. 
easy way to avoid persistent payments imbalances. 
Thus, there was no 
These structural flaws In the international economy which were the 
fundamental cause of its collapse after 1929 could not have been 
corrected by hegemonic policies. The weakness of the agricultural 
sector was essentially due to over supply which was caused by long-
t e r" m fa c tor'" s - r'" i sin g p r" 0 d u c t i v i t y , 0 pen 1 n g u p 0 f n e IrJ I and s , and 
slower population growth, especially in the industrialized regions. 
These underlying factors could not have been altered. The only 
possible way out would have been the temporary solution of prIce 
sup p 0 r" t s c hem e s . These were tried but failed, because they did not 
address the underlying causes of price weakness. 
Trade imbalances which the industrial regIons faced also had 
structural roots and therefore could not have been easily solved. 
There were two possible markets for the products of the 
industrial economies of Europe: the agricultural economies and 
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the United States. For the agricultural regIons to have demanded 
more of the produce of industrial regIons, the agricultural crISIS 
would first have to be solved. But t his was not po s sib Ie, c e }""' t a i n I y 
not in the short term. And, f 0 'r"' a v a'r"' i e t y 0 f 'r"' e a son s ( dis c u sse dIn 
chapter 2), the United States economy had over several decades 
developed a very low marginal propensity to import, and therefore 
could not have been a suitable market for distress goods. The basic 
structure of the United States economy would have had to change if 
it were to significantly increase its imports of industrial goods. 
The interwar period was simply not long enough to allow such an 
change to occur' 
It could be argued that even though the continuing outflow of funds 
from the United States could not have gone on indefinitely, the 
United States might have attempted to delay cutting off the outflow 
of capital till a few years after 1929 so as not to add a further 
shock to the world economy at a time when most national economies 
were beginning to falter. However, desirable though this might have 
been, it could not have happened because after 1929 the United 
States itself fell rapidly into a depression suffering a major 
banking collapse. The United States should have first been able to 
stabilize its own economy if it was to act as a stabilizing hegemon. 
But it proved incabable of doing this until the onset of the Second 
Though the economic difficulties of the time were 
daunting, I would not want to argue that they could not have been 
ov e}""'com e. The crisis was not unavoidable. But avoiding it would 
have required a degree of political will and economic wisdom that 
simply did not exist. The reparations/war debt question and the 
mismanagement of financial crIses exemplify this. So too does the 
course of foreign economic policy making In the United States. 
7S 
H e t"' e , a s we h a v e see n , the 0 vet"' t"' i din g d e t e r"' min ant was d 0 m est i c 
pol i tic s a s a f f e c ted by the s t t"' U c t u t"' e 0 f co ali t ion s t hat f 0 t"' m e dan d 
dissolved with changing economic circumstances. 
economic policy was essentially reactive; its liberality and 
openness depended on the state of the international economy and the 
state of the domestic economy. Domestic economic management was 
relatively unsophisticated, both in the United States and elsewhere, 
consequently, domestic stabilization was difficult to achieve. 
This, combined with uncertainty about the international economy and 
international political tensions, meant that governments were 
extremely reluctant to relinquish protective measures. 
In this economlC and political situation, many governments opted for 
corporatist economic controls or mildly expansionary policies 
together with economic closure. This national capitalism or 
II Key n e s ian ism i non e co un t t"' Y II was p t"' 0 b a b 1 Y all t hat co u 1 d h a v e bee n 
achieved at the timeu International Keynesianism or Embedded 
Liberalism of the post-war era had to wait for a quite different set 
o f e con 0 m i c , soc i aI, and pol i tic a 1 cit"' cum s tan c e s - and d iff e t"' e n t 
domestic and international structures. 
Just as the circumstances of the interwar priod differed from those 
of the immediate postwar decades when embedded liberalism came into 
b e i n g , sot 0 0 dot hey d iff e t"' f t"' 0 m the p t"' e sen t • Analogies between 
the present and the interwar period should therefore be treated with 
caution. The fact that hegemonic stabiltiy theory misinterprets 
the interwar period should raise doubts about its value in 
comprehending the present. By questioning the value of the analogy 
between the interwar period and the present this thesis has 
pet ... f 0 t ... m e d a use f u 1 fun c t ion, b e c a use, a sEa t'" n est May put i t 1 n his 
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book, IILessons l1 of the Past, 
The most important task of the historian as historian is 
analysis of those instances which men in government are most 
1 ike 1 y t 0 see asp a t'" all e 1 s , a n a log i e s , 0 t'" P t'" e c e den t s • S u c h 
analysis may not in itself help officials perceive what to do. 
They may well decide that their general rule was right even if 
the preicise historical example thay had in mind was not 
ad e qua t e p t'" 0 0 fit s val i d i t y • At 1 e a s t , howe vet'" , the c h a lIe n g e 
to the example would have compelled closer thought about the 
ingerent logic of the rule; and if it ever turned out that the 
example was the source of the rule rather than mere 
ill u s t t'" a t ion, the c hal 1 eng e mig h t P t'" 0 m p t f'r'" e s h t h ink i n g (1). 
In this case it would seem that the interwar period was the source 
oft hell t'" U 1 e II ( h e gem 0 n i cst a b iIi t y the 0 t'" Y ) • It therefore becomes 
important to examine and analyse the present on its own terms and 
not simply by using a misplaced analogy drawn from a misunderstood 
period in the past. 
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